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REVISITING DE JURE EDUCATIONAL
SEGREGATION: LEGAL BARRIERS TO
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FOR CHILDREN
WITH SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NEEDS
Alison Nodvin Barkofft
INTRODUCTION
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 1
With these strong words, the United States Supreme Court declared
de jure segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education.2
Almost twenty years later, the courts finally addressed the last remaining
population excluded from schools-disabled children. Courts reiterated
these ideas from Brown when holding that states are obligated by the
Constitution to provide publicly supported education to disabled chil-
dren.3 In 1975, Congress codified this policy in the Education of the
Handicapped Act,4 and mandated that states provide a "free appropriate
public education' to all disabled children.5 De jure segregation of dis-
abled children was seemingly eliminated by the Education of the Handi-
capped Act. Discrimination has, however, persisted for one group of
disabled children-those with special health care needs.
This problem was caused by judicial inconsistency in determining
whether schools must provide nursing services to this population of chil-
dren. Congress provided a "free appropriate public education," which
includes "special education" and "related services" designed to meet a
disabled child's unique needs, but these terms have proven difficult to
t J.D., Emory School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia (1999); B.S., Comell University, Ithaca,
New York (1996). I would like to thank Lewis Golinker, Professor Frank Alexander, and my
family for their assistance and support.
1 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis removed)
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 See, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874.
4 Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1990)
(amended and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") at 20
U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. (1998)).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1998).
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apply.6 Related services include the supportive services necessary to
help a disabled child benefit from special education. 7 The language of
the related services provision encompasses only medical services used
for diagnostic and evaluation purposes.8 Medical services for all other
purposes are not covered by the Act and, therefore, are not included in
the related services that a school must provide. 9 In subsequent regula-
tions, the Secretary of the Department of Education (DOE) attempted to
clarify the scope of medical services covered by the related services pro-
vision. In particular, the Secretary noted that "school health services"
are related services. 10 School health services are defined as "services
provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person."" The
Secretary also attempted to clarify the scope of the medical services ex-
clusion by defining medical services as "services provided by a licensed
physician to determine a child's medically related disability that results
in the child's need for special education and related services."' 2 Unfor-
tunately, the Secretary's definitions have not cleared up the confusion
over which medical-type services are covered related services and which
are excluded medical services. This confusion complicates the lives of
children with special health needs, who require some medical assistance
to attend school. Children with special health care needs include tech-
nology-dependent children and medically fragile children. 13
The Supreme Court considered the scope of health-related services
in Irving Independent School District v. Tatro.14 The Court examined
whether a particular health procedure was a covered related service or an
excluded medical service. The Court relied upon the Secretary of DOE's
definitions of school health services (as those provided by a nurse) and of
medical services (as those provided by a physician).' 5 The requested
service at issue in Tatro could be provided either by a nurse or trained
6 See id
7 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998).
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1997).
11 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) (1997).
12 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1997).
13 A technology-dependent child "is a person from birth through 21 years of age...; has
a chronic disability; requires the routine use of a specific medical device to compensate for
loss of use of a life sustaining body function; and requires daily, ongoing care or monitoring
by trained personnel." 11 REPORT TO CoNGREss AND THE SECReTARY BY THE TASK FORCE ON
TECHNOLOGY DaPaNDENT CHILDREN, vii-1 (1988) ('Task Force Report"). A medically fragile
child is a child with a special health impairment that requires care from trained personnel but
does not use any medical device.
14 486 U.S. 883 (1984); see also infra Part ll.A. (for a detailed discussion of the Tatro
case).
15 See id at 892.
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layperson, or even by the student herself.16 The Court also mentioned
that the service requested was not particularly expensive, complicated, or
burdensome. 17 The Court, therefore, held that the requested service was
a covered related service and not an excluded medical service.' 8
Tatro has not been interpreted consistently by lower courts. In fact,
lower courts have interpreted Tatro as providing two completely differ-
ent tests for determining whether a service is a covered related service or
an excluded medical service. One line of cases interpreted Tatro as stat-
ing the following test: if a nurse or trained layperson can provide the
service then it is a covered related service, but if a doctor must provide
the service then it is an excluded medical service. 19 A second group of
lower courts interpret Tatro differently, requiring an examination of the
nature and extent of the service protected: if the service requested is in-
termittent, simple, and cheap then it is a covered related service, but if
the service requested is constant, complex, and expensive then it is an
excluded medical service. 20 These tests tend to be outcome determina-
tive. Courts applying the former uniformly conclude that the service is a
covered related service. Almost without exception, those that apply the
latter refuse to direct the school to provide the service. Thus, for chil-
dren with special health care needs, the opportunity to attend school is
controlled by the jurisdiction in which they happen to live, a factor that is
irrelevant to their educational needs and should be irrelevant to their edu-
cational opportunities.
For example, Melissa Detsel was21 a child who breathed through a
tracheostomy tube and had a ventilator. Despite her need for nursing
services, Melissa thrived at school.22 Unfortunately, when she brought
suit to require the school to provide her with nursing services, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the school was not required to
16 See id. at 894.
17 See id. at 894-95.
18 See id. at 895.
19 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. 'Garret F., 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998); Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch. Dist.,
968 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. M11. 997); Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist v. Joshua S., 715
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
20 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995); Detsel v. Bd.
of Educ., 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020
(D. Utah 1992).
21 Melissa passed away in February 1996. Her death should not lead to the inference that
she was incapable of attending school prior to, and for a majority of the ten years after, the
court's ruling.
22 "Melissa really enjoys going to school. She is very happy; she is excited before the
school bus comes. She enjoys being in school. In fact, on several occasions when she had to
leave school .... they literally had to drag her away crying because she didn't want to leave."
Testimony of Gregory Liptak, M.D. at 15, In re Melissa Detsel, 506 EHLR 378 (SEA N.Y.
1984).
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provide the services because they were complicated and costly.23 As a
result of the decision, Melissa would be limited to home-bound
tutoring. 24
By contrast, Garret F. was injured in a motorcycle accident when he
was three years old. As a result of spinal cord injuries, he is quadriplegic
and ventilator dependent. Garret's intellectual capabilities are not af-
fected by his disabilities. In order to attend school, he needs someone to
suction his tracheostomy tube and provide emergency assistance if nec-
essary. When Garret brought suit to require the school to provide these
services, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that these were the
type of services that Congress intended schools to provide to disabled
children in order to ensure them meaningful access to public education. 25
Without the provision of these services, Garret would be unable to even
enter the front door of the school.26 Because of the court's interpretation,
Garret is able to successfully attend public school.
Looking at the bare descriptions of Melissa and Garret, there is no
clear explanation why one child is able to attend school and the other is
excluded. The discrepancy is not due to a difference in their disabilities
or the type of services they require. Rather, the differences result from
inconsistent interpretations of the Supreme Court decision in Tatro re-
garding nursing services. The Supreme Court recognized the problems
caused by these inconsistencies and granted certiorari to Garret F. during
the 1997-98 term.27 Hopefully, the Supreme Court will provide some
guidance regarding the rights and obligations of families and schools re-
garding nursing services by the end of the 1998-99 term.
This article reviews existing tests and proposes an alternative
method for determining whether the services requested by a child with
special health care needs should be covered by the school. Part I con-
tains a discussion of the relevant special education laws. Part II dis-
cusses Tatro and the two lines of interpretation that have flowed from it.
Part III examines the extent/nature test. Part IV criticizes the physician/
23 See Detsel, 820 F.2d at 587; see also infra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
24 Melissa was not removed from school to a homebound placement because she suc-
cessfully challenged Medicaid's policy forbidding Medicaid-funded private duty nurses from
serving children outside of their home. See generally Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1990); see infra notes 359-69 and accompanying text (discussing Detsel v. Sullivan).
25 See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d 822; see also infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the Cedar Rapids case).
26 Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiori in the Supreme Court at 17, Cedar
Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., No. 96-1793 (October Term 1996) ("[The oppor-
tunity Garret F. seeks in this case in merely to get in the front door of the school and survive
for the school day. He is not seeking some ultimate level of educational experience.")
27 See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., - U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 1793
(1998).
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non-physician test. Part V proposes an alternative method for determin-
ing whether a child with special health care needs can attend school.
I. RELEVANT SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
A. INDrvIuALs WrrH DisABmLrriEs EDUCATION ACT
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress and courts expressed
concern regarding the exclusion of children with disabilities from the
educational system.28 This concern led Congress to include an "Educa-
tion of the Handicapped" title in the Elementary, Secondary, and Other
Educational Amendments of 1969.29 This new title provided grants to
programs for disabled children. 30 Congress was also concerned with the
marked shortage of effective special education programs.31 As a result,
one of the explicit purposes of the title was to "assist the states initiating,
expanding, and improving education programs designed to serve handi-
capped children. '32 In order to further facilitate the development of spe-
cial education programs, Congress codified this title into a separate act,
entitled the "Education of the Handicapped Act" (EHA) in 1975. 33
At the same time, federal courts began deciding major special edu-
cation cases using constitutional principles. In the first case, the parents
of a group of developmentally disabled children brought a class action
seeking to declare statutes that kept a majority of disabled children out of
school unconstitutional.3 4 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
a state from denying children with disabilities access to a public
education: 35
In an earlier case between the same parties, the court
noted that . . . "[h]aving undertaken to provide a free
28 See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1971).
29 See Elementary, Secondary, and Other Education Amendments of 1969, tit. VI, Pub.
L. No. 89-750, § 611, 84 Stat. §§ 121, 178 (1969); see also S. RP. No. 91-634, at 92 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768, 2834; H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975).
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-634, at 90, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768, 2832. "As
late as 1975, approximately 1,750,000 children of school age with disabilities were totally
excluded from free public schooling, while 2,200,000 were in programs that did not meet their
needs." MARC C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREAnsE 1:5 (1997).
32 S. REP. No. 91-634, at 90, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768, 2832.
33 See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 774 (1975).
34 See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pennsylvania 1972). In 1965, Pennsylvania estimated that "while 46,000 [disabled] chil-
dren were enrolled in public schools, another 70,000 to 80,000 [disabled] children between the
ages of five and 21 were denied access to any public education services in schools, home or
day care or other community facilities, or state residential institutions." Id. at 296.
35 See id. at 297.
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public education to all of its children, including its ex-
ceptional children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a
free public program of education and training. It is the
Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally re-
tarded child in a free, public program of education and
training appropriate to the child's capacity.
[P]lacement in a regular public school class is preferable
to placement in a special public school class and place-
ment in a special public school class is preferable to
placement in any other type of program of education and
training." 36
The court enjoined Pennsylvania from denying any developmentally
delayed child access to a free appropriate education in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 37 The court held that the state had a constitu-
tional obligation to provide public education services in appropriate set-
tings to disabled children.38
In the second major special education case, another group of parents
of disabled children brought a class action regarding the exclusion of
most disabled children from publicly supported education. 39 The federal
district court of the District of Columbia held that placement of disabled
children in appropriate settings and the use of appropriate procedures is
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4°
The court compared the exclusion of children with disabilities from
schools to the situation of providing unequal educational opportunities to
wealthy and less affluent students. 41 Since the court found the latter situ-
ation to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,42 "[a] fortiori,....
denying plaintiffs and their class not just an equal publicly supported
education but all publicly supported education while providing such edu-
cation to other children, violates the Due Process Clause." 43 Further-
36 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1259-60 (citations
omitted).
37 See id. at 1259.
38 See id. at 1260.
39 See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). As of 1972, out of an
estimated 22,000 disabled children in the District of Columbia, 18,000 disabled children were
not being furnished with a public education despite mandatory education laws. See id. at 868.
40 See id. at 874-76.
41 See id. at 875.
42 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967); but see San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that there is no fundamental right to equal
educational opportunities in public schools for wealthy and poor children).
43 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (emphasis added). The court also compared the exclusion
of disabled children to school segregation prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See id. at 874-75.
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more, the court specifically rejected the school board's argument that
insufficient funds excused the school board from its responsibility to pro-
vide public education to disabled students. 44 Thus, the court held that the
school district had a federal constitutional requirement to provide appro-
priate special education services.45 Based in large part on these federal
court decisions, Congress later amended the EHA to create and
strengthen the system of providing federal aid to states for the purpose of
improving special education services. 46 In 1990, Congress renamed the
EHA the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" (IDEA).47 The
purpose of the IDEA is:
[t]o assure that all children with disabilities have avail-
able to them, . . a free appropriate public education
which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure the rights
of children with disabilities and their parents or guardi-
ans are protected, to assist States and localities to pro-
vide for the education of all children with disabilities,
and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate children with disabilities. 48
44 See id. at 875. The court held that the child's interest in education outweighed the
state's interest in preventing an increase in fiscal burden and noted:
If insufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly sup-
ported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The
inadequacies... [of] insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly
cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' child or handicapped
child than on the normal child.
Id. at 876.
45 See id.
46 See S. REP. No. 94-168 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425. The language
of the EHA/IDEA is based upon language from the Mills and Pennsylvania Association of
Retarded Children cases. By establishing a federal law dealing with the educational rights of
disabled children, Congress avoided the waste of funds and judicial time and the possibility of
inconsistent decisions that could arise if each school district was sued under the constitutional
framework established in Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children and Mills. The Sen-
ate noted that by 1975, more than 36 court cases had recognized the rights of handicapped
children to an appropriate education. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 7 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1431.
47 See Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 597 (substituting "Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act" for "Education for the Handicapped Act."). The IDEA revised the language of
the EHA, substituting the term "handicapped" for the more politically correct term "disabled."
See Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (substituting provisions relating to children with
disabilities for provisions relating to handicapped children). When discussing the language of
the law generally, this comment will refer to the language of the IDEA unless otherwise stated.
48 Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1990), with 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1998). Congress spe-
cifically found that the special education needs of the more than eight million disabled children
in the United States were not being met. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(1), (2) (1990). More
than half did not receive an appropriate education that would give them a "full equality of
19981
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In order to ensure effective administration of this law, Congress es-
tablished an Office of Special Education Programs, within the Office of
Special Education and Rehabilitative Services in the DOE.49 The Secre-
tary of the DOE is charged with carrying out the provisions of the law by
issuing, amending, and revoking regulations implementing the IDEA.50
Congress also promised federal funds to assist states in providing
education to disabled students. 51 In order to qualify for funds, states
must demonstrate that they have a policy that assures all children with
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education.52 The state is
also required to show a goal of providing disabled children with such an
education from birth until the age of twenty-one.5 3 The state must also
show that it has established procedures to assure that:
[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disa-
bilities, including children in public or private institu-
tions or other care facilities, are educated with children
who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is
such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.54
This passage is understood to mean that children must be educated
in the "least restrictive environment" that is appropriate. 55
opportunity" and over one million disabled children were totally excluded from the public
school system and, therefore, not educated with their peers. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(1) (1998).
49 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (1998). The Secretary of the Department of Education has
the authority to clarify the Act through regulations. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1417(b) (1998).
50 See id.
51 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411 (1998). Federal funds are dispersed based on the number of
children receiving special education and related services. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(2)
(1998). Federal money can, however, only be spent once the state spends a certain amount of
its own money on education of its own children (determined by a formula set out in 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.184 (1997)). This ensures that children with disabilities receiving services with federal
aid "have at least the same average amount spent on them, from sources other than [the act], as
do the children in the school district taken as a whole." 34 C.F.R. § 300.183 (1997). A local
education agency must first spend its own money in an amount equal to its average expendi-
ture on a non-disabled child and then federal money is added for the cost of educating a
disabled child in excess of that amount. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.182-84 (1997)
52 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1) (1998).
53 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.123 (1997).
54 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1998). This language parallels that of Pennsylvania Association
of Retarded Children and Mills. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Penn-
sylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pennsylvania 1971).
55 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1997).
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Congress defines a "child with a disability" to include a child "with
mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or
language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance, ... orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic
brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities;
and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related serv-
ices."'56 When Congress mandated a "free appropriate public education"
(FAPE) it required that special education and related services be pro-
vided at public expense and in conformity with an individualized educa-
tion program.57
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of FAPE in Hudson
School District Board of Education v. Rowley.5 8 When faced with deter-
mining what substantive level of education was required by the EHA, the
Court held that the EHA's requirement of a FAPE is satisfied when a
state provides individualized instruction with sufficient support services
to permit the disabled child to receive an educational benefit from the
instruction.59 The EHA does not require states to "maximize the poten-
tial of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity pro-
vided to other children."' 60 The Court held that the EHA only requires
the school to provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consisting of "access
to specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. '61 A
number of states, however, require more than the federal minimum floor
of opportunity in their state education laws.62
Congress added additional procedures for the education of a dis-
abled student. One such procedure is that the school must develop an
individualized education program (IEP) for each student with a disabil-
ity.63 An "individualized education program" is a written plan of educa-
tion for each child with a disability created in a meeting with a
representative of the local education agency, the student's teachers, par-
56 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (1998).
57 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(8) (1998).
58 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
59 See id at 188-89.
60 la at 189-90 (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 531 (1980).
61 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
62 See, e.g., Brimmer v. Traverse City Area Pub. Schs., 872 F. Supp. 447, 454 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (citing Barwacz v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 1296, 1305 (W.D. Mich.
1987)) (applying Michigan law requiring maximizing a disabled child's potential, which
"clearly suggests that something more than the federal 'basic floor of opportunity' standard is
required to satisfy Michigan law"); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (lst
Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts special education law requiring maximization of disabled
child's educational progress). In order to receive federal funding through the IDEA, a state
must comply with both federal and state special education requirements. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1412, 1413 (1998).
63 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(4) (1998).
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ents or guardian of the child, and the child when appropriate. 64 An IEP
sets out the specifics of the child's special education program and neces-
sary related services. According to the Act, special education constitutes
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to
meet the unique needs of a child with a disability." 65 Related services
are defined as:
[t]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services (including66 speech pathology
and audiology, psychological services, physical and oc-
cupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic rec-
reation, social work services, counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, and medical serv-
ices, except that such medical services shall be for diag-
nostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required
to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education .... 67
The Secretary of the DOE clarified the statutory language through
regulations in an attempt to define the scope of the medical services ex-
clusion. The regulations specifically state that "school health services"
are a related service.68 "School health services" are defined as "services
provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person." 69 "Med-
ical services" are "services provided by a licensed physician to determine
a child's medically related disability that results in the child's need for
special education and related services."' 70 Unfortunately, confusion still
exists concerning the scope of the health services that a school must pro-
vide to disabled children.
The IDEA is a federal grant program with conditions attached. If a
state chooses not to take the IDEA funding, it does not have to comply
with the law. Although the federal constitution places some responsibil-
ity to educate disabled children on any state that provides public educa-
tion,71 these duties are not specific when compared to the detailed
64 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(11) (1998).
65 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(25) (1998).
66 "Including" means that "the items named are not all of the possible items that are
covered, whether like or unlike the ones named." 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (1997).
67 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998) (emphasis added). This comment will refer to the
italicized section as the medical services exclusion.
68 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1997).
69 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) (1997).
70 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1997).
71 See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that states must
provide a free appropriate education to disabled children based upon the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment), discussed supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text; Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pennsylvania
1972) (holding that states must provide disabled children with a free appropriate education
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scheme imposed by IDEA. Other federal laws, however, place specific
responsibilities on states in the provision of education to children with
disabilities and these laws apply even if the states do not take the IDEA
funds. 72
B. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197373 is an anti-discrimi-
nation statute. The law provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability in the United State... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."74 The law prohibits recipients of
any federal financial assistance from discriminating against disabled peo-
ple because of their disability.75 The statute defines an individual with a
disability as a person who: "(i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment.176
Section 504's regulations contain similar education provisions to
those in the IDEA. Section 504 requires that a "free appropriate public
education" be provided to all disabled children, regardless of the nature
or severity of their disability.77 As part of a FAPE, section 504 also
requires schools to provide special education and related services. 7
Similar to the concept of least-restrictive environment in IDEA, section
504 requires school districts to educate disabled children with non-dis-
abled children to the "maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the
handicapped person."79 The regulations specifically state that one way
schools can ensure compliance with section 504 is by implementing an
IEP in accordance with the IDEA.80 A state or local education agency
that chooses not to receive the IDEA funds, but receives any other fed-
eral funds must, therefore, comply with essentially the same regulations
under section 504 as it would under the IDEA.
based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), discussed supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1998) (discussed infra Part
I.B.); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (1995) (discussed infra Part I.C.).
73 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1998).
74 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1998).
75 See H. RurnmRoRD TuRNBuLL I, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLic EDUCATION: Tim LAW
Am CmDREN wrm DisABarrs 19 (1990).
76 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (1998).
77 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (1998).
78 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (1998).
79 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (1998).
80 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (1998).
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The scope of the IDEA and section 504 are not precisely the same.
The IDEA only protects children who require special education services
due to their disabilities.81 Section 504 covers all school-age disabled
children, regardless of whether they require special education. 82 For ex-
ample, section 504 might apply to a child with AIDS who does not re-
quire special education services but requires reasonable accommodation
for his health problems, whereas the IDEA would not apply. Addition-
ally, the IDEA only encompasses the provision of a FAPE, while section
504 forbids discrimination generally. 83 Only section 504 applies to
schools that do not allow a disabled individual to participate in an extra-
curricular activity.84 A plaintiff may, therefore, have a claim under both
IDEA and section 504 or under only one of the laws.
Claims under section 504 and the IDEA can be filed together.85
Since compliance with the IDEA will generally result in compliance with
section 504, the only time the addition of a section 504 claim might make
a difference is in a case where the IDEA does not apply but section 504
does, or where the school complied with the IDEA, but not with section
504.86 Whenever a student is covered by both laws, however, he must
first pursue the IDEA procedures before he can go to court, even if he
raises the issue of non-compliance with section 504.87
C. AMERICANS WrrIH DIsABILrrIEs ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is another anti-discrim-
ination statute. Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities or a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.' '88 The ADA applies to any public entity, regardless of whether it
receives any financial assistance. 89
81 See 1 BoNInE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS
wrrH DisABirrms: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 8:2 (1995); see also Irving Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Tatro, 486 U.S. 883, 894 (1984) (stating that the IDEA only requires schools to pro-
vide educational services to students who qualify as disabled).
82 See id. at 8:2-8:3.
83 Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1998) (forbidding discrimination against people with
disabilities) with 48 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a) (1998) (requiring states to provide disabled children
wit a FAPE).
84 See TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 81, at § 8:3.
85 See id at 8:9.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (1995).
89 See Suong Main Cavalli & Martin L. Chen, An Overview of the Law Affecting Chil-
dren with Special Needs: Section 504, the ADA, and the IDEA, in REPRESENrING SPECIAL
NEEDS CHmDREN 9 (Ga. Inst. of C.L.E. eds., 1996).
DE JURE SEGREGATION
Unlike section 504, the ADA does not have a separate section deal-
ing with the provision of education for disabled individuals. Title II was
intended to be consistent with the regulations of section 504.90 Title II
regulations state that a public entity may not "[a]fford a qualified individ-
ual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the
aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to 'that afforded to others" 91 or
"[p]rovide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or
service that is not as effective in affording an equal opportunity to obtain
the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of
achievement as that provided to others." 92 When read in conjunction
with the section stating that the ADA cannot be construed so as to permit
lesser standards than those established by section 504,9 3 these regulations
require that schools districts provide a FAPE to the same extent as re-
quired under section 504.94 Therefore, a disabled student denied a FAPE
may also have a cause of action under the ADA.
Although the courts deciding special education cases have mainly
focused on the IDEA, a plaintiff may be able to bring concurrent claims
under the IDEA, section 504, and the ADA, or any combination of these
laws. The substantive provisions of these laws are generally similar, in-
cluding the scope of health related services to be provided to the child.
These laws or their regulations, however, do not specifically define the
scope of nursing services covered by the related services provision. As a
result, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with this issue in Irving In-
dependent School District v. Tatro.95
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
In Tatro, the Supreme Court held that some nursing services are
related services that must be provided by schools. 96 The case concerned
an eight year-old girl with spina bifida, named Amber Tatro.97 Amber
had multiple disabilities, including orthopedic and speech impairments
and a neurogenic bladder, that she was unable to empty voluntarily. As a
result, she was catheterized once every three or four hours to avoid kid-
ney injuries. The medical process required, Clean Intermittent Catheteri-
zation (CIC), which involves inserting a catheter into the urethra to drain
90 See id.
91 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (1998).
92 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) (1998).
93 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (1998).
94 See Cavalli & Chen, supra note 89, at 10.
95 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
96 Id. at 895.
97 See id. at 885.
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the bladder.98 Irving Independent School District agreed to provide Am-
ber special education services and prepared an JEP for her. Amber's IEP
provided that she would attend early development classes and would re-
ceive related services such as physical and occupational therapy. The
JEP failed to provide for the administration of CIC.99
After exhausting their administrative remedies, Amber's parents
brought suit in federal court under the EHA and sought an affirmative
injunction requiring that her IEP include the provision of CIC.100 The
Court noted that because Texas was receiving funds under the EHA, it
was required to provide a FAPE to all children with disabilities. 101 A
FAPE includes both special education and related services at no cost to
the parents.' 02 The Court framed the issue as whether CIC is a related
service'03 and announced a two-part test for determining whether a
school district is required to provide a service. 1' 4 The first prong is
whether the service requested is a "supportive servic[e] ... required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."'105 The
second prong is whether the service is an excluded medical service.10 6
Using this test, the Court held that CIC was a supportive service. 10 7
It noted that the purpose of the EHA was to make public education avail-
able to children with disabilities and for that access to be meaningful: 10
A service that enables a handicapped child to remain at
school during the day is an important means of provid-
ing the child with the meaningful access to education
that Congress envisioned.... Services like CIC that per-
mit a child to remain at school during the day are no less
98 See iL
99 See iL at 886.
100 See iaL Her parents also tried to bring a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. The Court, however, decided in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), that
section 504 does not apply when relief can be obtained under the EHA. Therefore, the Court
held that Amber was not entitled to relief under section 504. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 894. In
1986, Congress amended the EHA to change this rule: "Nothing in this [law] shall be con-
strued to restrict of limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [citation
omitted], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(1) (1998) (citations omitted). A plaintiff bringing an action under other laws must
exhaust remedies to the same extent as would be required under the IDEA. Id.
101 See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 889.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 890.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 See icL
107 See id
1o8 See id. at 891 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
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related to the effort to educate than are services that en-
able the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.0 9
The Court specifically rejected the district court's rationale that CIC
was not a related service because it did not serve a need arising from the
effort to educate. 1 0 By this, the Court made clear that it would interpret
supportive services broadly.
As for the second prong of the test, the Court held that CIC was not
an excluded medical service."' The Court relied on the Secretary of the
DOE's definition of school health services, as services provided by a
nurse or other qualified individual, and of medical services as services
provided by a physician. 112 The Secretary determined that:
the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a
'related service' are not subject to exclusion as a 'medi-
cal service,' but that the services of a physician are ex-
cludable as such.... By limiting the 'medical services'
exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital....
the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the
provision.113
When discussing the reasons for the medical exclusion, the Court
stated that Congress may have intended "to spare schools from an obliga-
tion to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and
beyond the range of their competence."' 14 The Court noted that Con-
gress did require schools to hire certain trained personnel, such as occu-
pational, physical, and speech therapists. 115 It was reasonable for the
Secretary to conclude that nurses were such trained personnel and that
''nursing services are not the sort of burden that Congress intended to
exclude as a 'medical service.'"116
109 ML The Court also noted that the Third Circuit had found CIC to be a related service,
and that the Department of Education agreed with this finding in its interpretive ruling. See id.
(citing Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1981).
110 See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891 (rejecting rationale in Tatro v. Tex., 481 F. Supp. 1224,
1227 (N.D. Tex. 1979)).
11 See id
112 See id. at 892; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(b)(4), (11) (1997).
113 IL at 892-93.
114 Id. at 892.
115 See id. at 893.
116 Id. at 893. The Court rejected the school district's argument that CIC was 2Jx excluded
medical service because it must be ordered by a doctor and is ultimately under a doctor's
supervision. See id. School nurses are authorized to give medication and administer emer-
gency injections in accordance with a doctor's prescription. "It would be strange indeed if
Congress, in attempting to extend special services to handicapped children were unwilling to
guarantee them services of a kind that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped." Id. at
893-94.
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The Court also mentioned some specific limitations on the provision
of health services to disabled children. First, a child must be disabled in
order to qualify for special education services. 117 Second, only services
necessary to help a disabled child benefit from special education must be
provided, regardless of how easily additional services could be fur-
nished."l 8 Third, "the regulations state that school [health] services must
be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified
person, not if they must be performed by a physician."'1 9 The Court
noted that in Amber's case, not even the services of a nurse were re-
quired because a layperson could easily be trained to perform CIC. Fi-
nally, in this case, Amber's family was planning to provide the necessary
equipment for CIC.120 'As a result of their finding that CIC was a related
service and was not a medically excluded service, the Court held that the
school district must provide the requested nursing services to Amber.121
Tatro, however, has not been interpreted consistently by lower courts.
A significant source of the inconsistency is the Tatro court's failure
to clearly articulate the test used in determining whether the school dis-
trict was required to provide the nursing services. One line of cases in-
terpret Tatro as applying a test that balances the extent and nature of the
services requested in order to determine whether the service is so burden-
some to the district that it becomes medical in nature and is therefore
excludable. 122 A second line of cases interpret Tatro to create a bright
line test depending on the qualifications of the person required to provide
the service.' 2 3
117 See id. at 894; see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(1) (1998).
118 See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 895. The Court gave the example that if a disabled student
could be given medication other than during the school day, then a school is not required to
administer it as a related service. Id. at 894.
119 Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(11) (1997).
120 The significance of this consideration may have been lessened by the amendment to
the IDEA that requires schools to provide assistive technology devices. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1401(1), (2); 1412(12)(B) (1998). An assistive technology device is "any item,.piece of
equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially off the shelf, modified, or cus-
tomized, that is used to increase, maintain, or improve the functional capabilities of a child
with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(1) (1998); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1997).
121 See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 895.
122 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6' Civ. 1995) (discussed
infra notes 152-69 and accompanying text); Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 820 F.2d 597 (2d Cir.
1987) (discussed infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text).
123 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822 (81h Cir.
1997) (discussed infra 215-18 and accompanying test); Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park
Sch. Dist. 95, 968 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. IMI. 1997) (discussed infra notes 236-50 and accompany-
ing text).
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B. Tim EXTENT/NATURE TEST
A number of courts interpret Tatro as applying a balancing test to
determine if a service is a related or an excluded medical service. The
"extent/nature test," balances such factors as cost of the service, com-
plexity of procedure, and amount of time required to perform the
service.124
At least two circuits and a number of district courts have accepted
the extent/nature test. The Second Circuit announced the extent/nature
test in Detsel v. Board of Education,125 the first case interpreting the
scope of school nursing services after Tatro. Melissa Detsel was a child
with significant physical disabilities who breathed through a ventilator
and had a tracheostomy.' 26 She had above average intelligence and was
able to participate in activities with her class. In order to attend school,
Melissa needed medical personnel to suction mucus from her tracheos-
tomy, administer medication through a tube to her intestine, monitor her
vital signs, and be prepared to perform emergency procedures arising
from complications with her tracheostomy.127 The trial court found that
the school nurse could not provide the services, and that an LPN or RN
would be required. 128
When Melissa began school in the Auburn School District, an IEP
was created. Her IEP classified her as "other health impaired," and listed
the related services to be provided to her, including speech and language
therapy, physical therapy, occupational therapy, adaptive physical educa-
tion and "appropriate school health services.' 2 9 The IEP, unfortunately,
failed to establish the appropriate health services required.130
After the school district denied Melissa's request for additional
services related to her disability, she initiated a due process hearing
before a State Department of Education hearing officer. The hearing of-
ficer determined that the services requested were related services, and the
school appealed to the Commissioner of the State Department of Educa-
tion.' 3 ' The Commissioner concluded the procedures were not related
124 See, e.g., Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (examin-
ing cost, complexity, and time for the requested procedure); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M.,
787 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (D. Utah 1992) (examining cost, complexity, and time for requested
service).
125 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on reasoning of district court).
126 See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026. A tracheostomy involves the insertion of a tube into
the trachea to assist with breathing.
127 See id. at 1024.
128 See id. at 1025. It is worth noting that in New York state, a school nurse must at least
be a registered nurse. N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 902(1) (McKinney 1997); see infra Section
lI.B.4. (for a discussion of training required for different types of nurses).
129 Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1024.
130 See id. at 1023.
131 See id
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services. 132 After exhausting her administrative remedies, Melissa ap-
pealed the Commissioner's decision to the federal district court.
The district court held that the services requested were not related
services.' 33 Melissa argued that the Court in Tatro established a bright
line test: if a nurse can provide the service, then it is a school health
service that the school must provide as a related service; contrarily, if a
doctor must provide the service, then it is an excluded medical service
that the school is not required to provide. 134 Melissa's argument focused
on the nature of the provider. The school argued that although the dis-
puted services did not necessarily require a physician, they were essen-
tially medical in nature' 35 and that "the question of whether a supportive
service is a medical service is a matter of degree."' 36 The school asked
the court to focus on the nature of the service requested, not the status of
the person performing the procedure. The school, however, did not offer
any evidence about where the court should draw the line between sup-
portive services and medical services.
Looking to Tatro for guidance, the district court reiterated the two-
part test: first, do the services in question qualify as supportive services;
and second, do they fall within the medical services exclusion. 137 As for
the first prong, the court noted that the Supreme Court "analogized 'sup-
portive services' to services which enabled a child to remain at school
during the day."' 138 Based on this definition, the court held that the serv-
ices requested by Melissa were supportive because they allowed Melissa
to attend school.' 39 The court noted, however, that the school was not
required to provide all supportive services. 140
The Detsel court examined the medical exclusion prong of the test.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's discussion of cost and compe-
tence in Tatro in rejecting the bright line test regarding medical serv-
ices,14 ' holding instead that "[it is clear that the Supreme Court
considered the extent and nature of the service performed in the Tatro
132 See id.
133 See id- at 1027.
134 See i&L at 1024.
135 See id. at 1027.
136 Id. at 1025.
137 See id. at 1026.
138 Id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 1027. The Supreme Court determined that the Secretary of DOE had inter-
preted the scope of the medical exclusion reasonably and stated that Congress's purpose in the
medical exclusion might have been to "spare schools from an obligation to provide a service
that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence." Irving
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
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decision."' 42 The court factually distinguished the services requested in
Tatro from the service requested by Melissa and noted:
Unlike CIC, the services required by Melissa are
extensive. This is not a simple procedure which the
child may perform herself. Constant monitoring is re-
quired in order to protect Melissa's very life. The record
indicates that the medical attention required by Melissa
is beyond the competence of a school nurse. A specially
trained individual is required, preferably a health
professional. 143
The court added factors such as cost,144 complexity and time into
the reasoning for the medical service exclusion.
The district court also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Rowley. 145 According to Rowley, the EHA only requires schools to pro-
vide a minimum floor of opportunity and schools are not required to
maximize each disabled student's potential. 146 The parties admitted that
without the provision of the requested service, "Melissa must receive
only in-home instruction."' 47 The district court determined that although
this was not the ideal situation for Melissa, it did meet the minimum
required by the EHA. 148
The court, therefore, held that if nursing services are complex and
costly, they can be excluded as medical services because of their burden
on the school. 149 If nursing services are simple and do not similarly bur-
den the school, then they are related services that must be provided by
the school. 150 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. 151
142 Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026.
143 [d at 1026-27.
144 It is worth noting that the attorney for the school district specifically denied basing his
argument upon cost factors. See Record at 6-7, Detsel, 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
145 See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1027 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982)).
146 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199-201.
147 Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026 (emphasis added).
148 See ia at 1027. It appears, however, that the court misapplied Rowley to the case at
hand. The nature of the educational program was not in question in Detsel. The issue ulti-
mately was whether provision of health services, and as a result the least restrictive environ-
ment, would be in school or at home.
149 See iL
150 See id.
151 See Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987). The circuit court mainly
focused on distinguishing Melissa's case from the Ninth Circuit decision, Department of Edu-
cation v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983). The court in Katherine D. held that
suctioning and monitoring a ventilator were both related nursing services. See id The Detsel
court distinguished Melissa's case from that of Katherine by stating that Katherine's care was
only intermittent while Melissa's was constant. See Detsel, 820 F.2d at 588. Moreover, the
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The Sixth Circuit also adopted the extent/nature test in Neely v.
Rutherford County School.152 Samantha Neely was a child with congeni-
tal central hypoventilation syndrome, a rare condition causing breathing
difficulties. 153 Samantha required a tracheostomy in order to breathe. In
order to attend school, Samantha needed an attendant to regularly suction
her tracheostomy 154 and to administer emergency care if necessary.
The school district agreed to hire a full-time nurse or respiratory
care specialist as stated in Samantha's IEP, but only hired a nursing as-
sistant. The parents brought a suit requesting the school to hire a nurse
to provide in-school care for Samantha.' 55 The administrative law judge
concluded that the requested services were excluded medical services.' 56
On appeal, the district court determined that the requested nursing serv-
ices were supportive services and were not excluded by the medical serv-
ices provision. 157
The Sixth Circuit reversed, reiterating the two part Tatro test: first,
whether the requested service is a supportive service; and second,
whether the service is excluded as a medical service.' 58 On the first
prong, both parties agreed that the requested service was supportive be-
cause it was necessary for Samantha to be able to enjoy the benefits of
services provided to Katherine D. did not require as much expertise as did the services pro-
vided to Melissa. See id.
152 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995). A district court prior to this decision, however, rejected
the extent/nature test. See Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Mich. 1989). That court stated that the extent/nature test "[u]nquestionably...
ignores Tatro's conclusion that '[bly limiting the 'medical services' exclusion to the services
of a physician or hospital, . . . the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provi-
sion."' Id. at 828 (quoting Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 833, 893 (1984)). The
district court, therefore, held that the medical services exclusion is limited to services provided
by a licensed physician. See id. The Joshua S. decision was not specifically overruled or even
mentioned in the Neely case. Other state hearing officers in the Sixth Circuit held that schools
had to provide private duty nurses to students prior to Neely. See, e.g., Caledonia Pub. Schs.,
19 IDELR (LRP) 1125 (Apr. 19, 1993) (holding school must provide students with school
health services necessary to meet her health care needs). See also Tanya v. Cincinnati Bd. of
Educ., 651 N.E.2d 1373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). In Tanya, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
a school had to provide a RN or LPN to a health impaired child to meet its obligations under
the IDEA. However, the court did not explicitly adopt or reject either test.
153 See Neely, 68 F.3d at 967.
154 See id. at 967 (noting that an attendant, and not a nurse, would be able to perform the
necessary procedures. The number of times Samantha needed to be suctioned varied and if
Samantha was in good health, she might only need to be suctioned after meals. If she had a
cold, she might need to be suctioned as often as every 20 minutes).
155 See id.
156 See id. at 968. It is unclear that the judge should have made this determination. The
issue on appeal was whether the school had to provide a full-time nurse or respiratory care
specialist or whether providing a nursing assistant was enough. On appeal, the judge said that
the school was required to provide neither. See id.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 969.
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special education. 159 In regard to the second prong, however, the court
noted that Tatro had been interpreted in two different ways: a bright line
physician/non-physician test and a balancing of interests extent/nature
test. 160 The court relied upon decisions that rejected the bright line test
and accepted the extent/nature test 161 and held that "it is appropriate to
take into account the risk involved and the liability factor of the school
district inherent in providing a service of a medical nature such as is
involved in this controversy."' 162 Thus, the court added factors of risk
and liability into the extent/nature balancing equation. The court held
that the services requested in this case caused an undue burden on the
school system because of the nature of the care involved.' 63 The services
requested were varied and intensive and the care of a Licensed Practi-
tioner Nurse (LPN) or Registered Nurse (RN) was required. 164 Most im-
portantly, the nursing services requested had to be provided on a constant
basis.165 The court held that the services caused an undue burden on the
school district and, therefore, the services requested by Samantha fell
into the medical services exclusion. 166
A district court in the Tenth Circuit also adopted the extent/nature
test in Granite School District v. Shannon M. 167 Shannon was a child
with congenital neuromuscular atrophy and severe scoliosis. Shannon
used a wheelchair, breathed through a tracheostomy tube, and received
food through a nasogastric tube. In order to attend school, Shannon re-
quired suctioning of her tracheostomy tube five times per three hour
school day, monitoring, and provision of emergency services if neces-
159 See id.
160 See id at 970.
161 See id. at 970-71. For decisions by courts rejecting the bright-line test and adopting
the extent/nature test, see, e.g., Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah
1992); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1987); Detsel v. Bd. of Educ.,
637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987).
162 Neely, 68 F.3d at 971.
163 See id at 971.
164 See id. Tennessee law requires that the service requested be provided by a physician,
registered practical nurse, licensed practical nurse, respiratory care specialist, the patient's rel-
atives or the patient herself. See iL at 971; see also infra Section II.BA. (for a discussion of
training required for different levels of nurses).
165 See Neely, 68 F.3d at 971-72. Samantha's parents argued that she did not require
constant care. They argued that as long as the nurse had a pager and was nearby, the nurse
could be outside of the classroom. The district court found that the cost of providing a nurse to
Samantha was not an undue burden on the district and the school district agreed to provide
Samantha with a nursing assistant and the cost of an LPN would not be much more. See Neely
v. Rutherford County. Sch., 851 F. Supp. 888, 894 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). The Sixth Circuit,
however, reversed this finding based on a clearly erroneous standard concerning inappropriate
cost comparisons considered by the trial court. See Neely, 68 F.3d at 972-73; see also infra
Section Ill.B.I. (discussing Samantha's case in greater detail).
166 See Neely, 68 F.3d at 973.
167 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992).
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sary. The parties agreed that, at the least, an LPN was required to per-
form the duties.168
The court analyzed Rowley to determine whether Shannon could be
provided with an appropriate education without the nursing services. 169
In Rowley, the Supreme Court determined that the EHA only requires
that schools provide access to education sufficient to confer some educa-
tional benefit, and does not require schools to provide an opportunity to a
disabled student equal to that of a non-disabled student.170 Since the
court determined that Shannon's school met the Rowley basic floor of
opportunity, the court held that the school was not required to provide
the additional services. 171 The court also noted that the school did not
have to place Shannon in the best environment, but only in an appropri-
ate environment. 172
The court analyzed Shannon's situation under the two-part test of
Tatro and acknowledged that the requested services were supportive. 173
Regarding the scope of the medical services exclusion, the court refused
to accept the bright line physician/non-physician test.174 Similar to Det-
sel and the line of cases based on it, the court held that Tatro created a
test that distinguished between students needing intermittent care with
procedures requiring less expertise and students requiring complex con-
stant care.175
168 See id. at 1022 n.3 (noting that Shannon's parents were not concerned with who pro-
vides the care, but for purposes of litigation, they stipulated that at least an LPN was required).
169 See icL at 1023-24.
170 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); see also supra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text.
171 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1029.
172 See id; see also Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Ed., 918 F.2d 618, 627 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that court must not examine which placement is most advantageous but whether the
proposed placement is appropriate). It is worth noting that Shannon's placement was not a
litigated issue but the a fortiori result of the related services issue. See id.
173 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1024-25, 1028.
174 See id. at 1026. The Shannon M. court partially based its decision on Max M. v.
Thompson. 592 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. li. 1984) (holding that psychotherapy, a recognized
related service, does not become excluded as a medical service simply because a psychiatrist
provides the service). The Shannon M. court described the bright line test as:
an arbitrary classification of services based solely on the licensed status of the ser-
vice provider. If a licensed physician may provide related services without their
becoming instantly 'medical,' we believe that by the same token a program clearly
aimed at curing an illness-whether mental or physical-does not become instantly
'related' when it can be implemented by persons other than licensed physicians.
787 F. Supp. at 1026-27. The court, however, mistakenly believed that the purpose of the
nurse was to aid in curing Shannon, and not only to help her benefit from special education.
See id. The court held that it is arbitrary not to classify a certain service as medical just
because it is not provided by a doctor. See id. The court then drew the conclusion that another
service can be classified as medical because it would be just as arbitrary to conclude that
service is medical even though it is not provided by a doctor. See id.
175 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1030; see, e.g., Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp.
71(W.D. Pennsylvania 1987); see also infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text (analyzing
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The court found that the school provided Shannon with the mini-
mum floor of opportunity by providing her home instruction. The court
recognized that the IDEA requires mainstreaming unless it cannot be sat-
isfactorily achieved, but held that mainstreaming was not possible in this
case because of the high costs, 17 6 the constant care needed, and the com-
plexity of the services requested.' 77 The court, therefore, held that the
requested services were excluded medical services and the school did not
have to provide them. 178
The Ninth Circuit appears to have rejected the physician/non-physi-
cian test in Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Admin-
istrative Hearings.179 This case involved Michelle Shorey, a student
with emotional disabilities. Michelle's parents rejected the school's pro-
posed residential placement and requested that the school pay for a pri-
vate placement for psychological services.' 80 The school recognized that
the IDEA can require residential placement, but it argued that Michelle's
private placement was based upon a medical need rather than an educa-
tional need.' 18 The family argued that the placement was a required re-
lated service.' 8 2 The court looked to Tatro for guidance, interpreting it
as relying in part, but not solely, on the status of the provider.'8 3 The
Clovis court claimed that Tatro also relied in part on the extent and na-
ture of the requested service and the burden the service would impose on
the school district.'8 4 The court also approved of the reasoning of Detsel
and applied the extent/nature test, holding that the services requested
were excluded medical services.' 8 5 Thus, it appears the Ninth Circuit
has adopted the extent/nature test.' 86
the Bevin case). The court rejected Shannon's reliance on Department of Education v. Kathe-
rine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983), and Macomb County Intermediate School District v.
Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The court distinguished Shannon's case from
that of Katherine D., stating that Katherine only required intermittent services while Shannon
required constant care. The court rejected Joshua S. because, unlike Shannon, he was not
offered home instruction. See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1028.
176 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1029. The cost of the nurse was estimated at $30,000
per year. No cost of home instruction was presented. The court stated that "the expense of
providing Shannon's requested care would undoubtedly take money away from other pro-
grams." Id.; but see infra note 346 and accompanying text. The estimate of $30,000 appears
to be an over-estimation. See infra Section lII.B.l.b. (for discussion).
177 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1029
178 See id. at 1030.
179 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
180 See id. at 639.
181 See id. at 642.
182 See iL at 641-42.
183 See id at 642-44.
184 See id. at 644.
185 See id.
186 The Ninth Circuit's earlier decision of Department of Education v. Katherine D., 727
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a school district was required to provide nursing serv-
ices to a child with a tracheostomy, including monitoring, suctioning, and provision of emer-
19981
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A number of district courts in the Third Circuit also appear to have
adopted the extent/nature text. One district court decision, Fulginiti v.
Roxbury Township Public Schools,187 was affirmed by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision of questionable precedential
value.188 Carissa Fulginiti was a child born with severe multiple disabili-
ties, causing her to require a tracheostomy and feeding tube.18 9 In order
to attend school, Carissa needed a nurse to suction her tracheostomy
tube, monitor her health, and provide emergency care if necessary. The
Fulginiti family requested a due process hearing before an administrative
law judge. The administrative law judge based his ruling that the re-
quested services were excluded medical services on an application of the
extent/nature test.190 The district court affirmed the administrative law
judge's decision, focusing on the cost of the service.191 The court con-
cluded that the requested services were "medical in nature" and, there-
fore, outside of the school board's responsibilities.' 92 The Third Circuit
affirmed the decision in an unpublished opinion, noting that this case
"appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties .... "193 Thus,
it is not clear whether the Third Circuit will adopt the extent/nature test.
One of the most frequently cited district court decisions is Bevin H.
v. Wright.194 Bevin was a child with multiple disabilities, including
gency care when necessary), was not explicitly overruled or mentioned in the Clovis decision.
Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1990). Katherine D. was decided before Tatro, so it is unclear what framework the court used
to make that decision.
187 921 F. Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. 1996).
188 Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 116 F.3d 468 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("The Third
Circuit provides by rule for the reporting of opinions having 'precedential or institutional
value. An opinion which appears to have value only to the trial court or to the parties is
ordinarily not published."')
189 See Fulginiti, 921 F. Supp. at 1321.
190 See id. at 1322.
191 The court accepted the school board's claim that the requested services would cost
$56,000 despite the claim by the Fulginiti family and their expert that the figure was unneces-
sarily high. See id. at 1325; see also infra Section III.B.I.b. (for a discussion of the school's
over-estimation of costs).
192 Id. at 1325.
193 Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 116 F.3d 468 (3rd Cir. 1997).
194 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1987). Other district decisions adopted the ex-
tent/nature test. See Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1321, 1324
(D.N.J. 1996) (holding tracheostomy suctioning, feeding through a gastronomy tube, and con-
stant monitoring were excluded medical services because plaintiff failed to show that the re-
quested services would not unduly burden the district when at-school nursing would cost
$56,000 per year (making the total of providing at-school special education $95,000) while
home instruction would cost $56,000 per year); Glen Rock Bd. of Educ., 17 EHLR (LRP) 713
(Feb. 27, 1990) (holding provision of medically trained one-to-one aide as an excluded medi-
cal service based on Bevin H.); but see Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3rd
Cir. 1981) (holding that CIC was a related service because school nurses could perform it, it
required little time, it was not expensive, and the alternatives were more expensive and vio-
lated the principles of the EHA).
DE Jui. SEGREGATION
Rainbow Syndrome, severe heart problems, quadriplegia, mental impair-
ments, and blindness. She breathed through a tracheostomy tube and
was fed and medicated through a gastrostomy tube. In order for Bevin to
attend school, she needed a nurse to care for and clean her tracheostomy
and gastrostomy tubes, suction the tracheostomy tube, and provide emer-
gency assistance when necessary. 195 The court noted that a number of
other courts had made determinations about related services, 196 but only
Detsel involved services as extensive as those requested by Bevin.
The court rejected Bevin's argument for a bright line physician/non-
physician test based on Detsel.197 Like the Detsel court, the court in
Bevin H. found the requested services resembled medical services even
though they were not provided by a physician. 198 The court stated that a
balancing of interests to determine the reasonableness of the requested
service had been implicit in the prior decisions of other courts. 199 Such
factors included: "cost of the service, the time involved and the capacity
of existing school health personnel to provide the service. ''2°°
In Bevin's case, the court determined that requiring the school to
provide services to Bevin was unreasonable:
The services required are varied and intensive. They
must be provided by a nurse, not a layperson. They are
time-consuming and expensive. Above all, the life
threatening prospect of a mucus plug demands the con-
stant attention of a nurse. Because this need for constant
vigilance, a school nurse or other qualified person with
responsibility for other children within the school could
not safely care for Bevin. It is the "private duty" aspect
of Bevin's nursing services that distinguishes this case
from the others. [Other cases] all involved intermittent
care which could be provided by the school district at
relatively little expense in both time and money. The
services Bevin requires are far beyond those, and to
place that burden on the school district in the guise of
195 See Beven H., 666 F. Supp. at 73.
196 See id. at 74; see, e.g., Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987) (holding
constant nursing not to be a related service); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883,
895 (1984) (holding CIC to be a related service); Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d
809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding tracheostomy care as a related service); Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982) (holding sign language interpreter not required as a related
service); Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 443 (holding CIC to be a related service).
197 See Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 74-75.
198 See id.
199 See id at 74.
200 Id. at 75.
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"related services" does not appear to be consistent with
the spirit of the Act and its regulations. 20 1
The court also relied on Rowley for the proposition that schools are
not required to "provide the best possible education without regard to
expense. '202 Not only did the court specifically note that it did not "in-
tend to intimate that 'related services' [are] only those services which
can be provided at low cost to the school district or which can be per-
formed by existing school personnel," but it also held that the nursing
services requested by Bevin were "so varied, intensive, and costly, and
more in the nature of 'medical services' that they [were] not properly
includable as 'related services." 20 3 Thus, the Bevin H. court added in-
tensity as a factor in the extent/nature test.
C. THE PHYSICIAN/NON-PHYSICIAN TEST
A separate line of cases interprets Tatro to provide a bright-line test
based on the status of the provider of the services. 204 If the provider is a
nurse or other trained layperson, then the service is a related school
health service; but if the provider must be a physician, the service is an
excluded medical service. This is the "physician/non-physician test." At
least one circuit and a number of district courts adopted this
interpretation.205
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the physician/non-
physician test in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret
F.20 6 Garret was severely injured in an accident as a child. Although
Garret's mental abilities were unaffected, the accident injured his spinal
cord causing him to become quadriplegic and ventilator dependent. In
order to attend school, Garret required medical personnel to assist with
CIC, suction his tracheostomy tube at least once every six hours and after
meals, monitor his health, and provide emergency assistance as
needed.207 The school refused to provide continuous, one-on-one nurs-
ing, and Garret's parents challenged the school's position. The adminis-
trative law judge and the district court both determined that the services
201 1l at 75 (emphasis added).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 76. It is worth noting that the courts assume that the best possible education is
always the most expensive.
204 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir.
1997); Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch. Dist. 95, 968 F. Supp. 385, 394 (N.D. 111.
1997).
205 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8b Cir.
1997); Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch. Dist. 95, 968 F. Supp. 385, 394 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Morton Community United Sch. Dist. v. J.M. (C.D. Il1. 1997).
206 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir.1997), cert. granted, _ U.S._...._, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
207 See id. at 823.
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did not fall within the medical services exclusion and must be provided
as related services. 208
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the administrative law judge, relying
on the two-part test from Tatro.20 9 The court held the services were sup-
portive because without the services Garret could neither attend school
nor benefit from special education. 210 The court applied the second part
of the Tatro test and found that "[i]n Tatro, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a bright-line test: the services of a physician (other than for diag-
nostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the medical services
exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a
nurse or qualified layperson are not."'211 The court noted the existence of
other decisions rejecting such a bright-line test,212 but stated that those
courts relied on dicta in Tatro and had improperly "factor[ed] into the
medical services exclusion considerations of the nature and extent of the
services performed. '213 The court refused to rely on dicta to go beyond
the physician/non-physician test which, it said, the Supreme Court set out
in Tatro.2 1 4
An opinion from a state DOE hearing officer, which was affirmed
by the Eighth Circuit on appeal, stated larger policy reasons in favor of
the physician/non-physician test.2 15 The hearing officer stated that the
IDEA requires districts to provide education programs in the least restric-
tive environment, and noted that children should only be removed from
the regular school environment when they cannot be successfully inte-
grated even with supportive services and aids.216 The officer found that
if the requested services were not provided to Garret, he would have to
be educated in a home-bound program. In the officer's findings, it is
noted:
While the law anticipates that the appropriate program
for some children will be an education program provided
at home, that appears to be totally inappropriate for
[Garret] and any similar student. The lack of stimulation
he now receives from a variety of teachers and peers
would have a profound effect on the rest of his life. A
208 See id. at 824.
209 See id. at 825.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir. 1995); Bd. of
Educ. v. Detsel, 637 F.Supp. 1022, 1027 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987);
Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1027 (D. Utah 1992).
213 Garret F., 106 F.3d at 825.
214 See id
215 See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 22 IDELR(LRP) 278 (1994).
216 See id. at 289.
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home-bound program would certainly not be an educa-
tion with nondisabled children to the "maximum extent
appropriate." Clearly, [Garret] receives much more ben-
efit from his being in school than his being at home, his
presence is not substantially disruptive to the school en-
vironment and his teacher's time is not unduly taken up
working with him individually.217
Since Garret could be integrated successfully in the classroom with
aid of supportive nursing services, the school was required to provide
these services. The officer found that the physician/non-physician test
was more true to the goals of the IDEA than the extent/nature test.218
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Garret F.219 and will decide the
case during the 1998-99 term.220
Two district courts in the Seventh Circuit also adopted the physi-
cian/non-physician test. The Central District of Illinois adopted the phy-
sician/non-physician test in Morton Community United School District v.
J.M.,22 1 which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 222
J.M. was a child with multiple physical disabilities which caused him to
217 See id.
218 See id
219 118 S.Ct. 1793 (May 18, 1998).
220 All interested parties submitted briefs. Garret supports the adoption of the physician/
non-physician test based on the language of the statute and regulations, legislative history,
Congressional intent, and general policy of the IDEA. See Resp. Brief, Cedar Rapids Commu-
nity Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998 WL 541985 (1998). Garret also argues that even if the court
adopts the extent/nature test, Garret's services are not burdensome enough on the school dis-
trict to become excluded medical services. See id. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and a
group of disability organizations submitted briefs supporting Garret's position. See Dep't of
Justice, Amicus Brief, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998 WL 541989
(1998); Family Voices, Amicus Brief, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998
WL 541990 (1998). The DOJ and disability organizations argue for the adoption of the physi-
cian/non-physician test based upon arguments similar to those of Garret-statutory interpreta-
tion of the statute and regulations, Congressional intent and legislative history, and policy
arguments. See id. Cedar Rapids School District supports the adoption of the extent/nature
test. See Pet. Brief, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998 WL 375420 (1998).
Cedar Rapids argues that the language of the statue and regulations do not mandate a bright-
line test, and that the plain language supports the extent/nature test. See id. Cedar Rapids also
contends that the Secretary of the DOE rejected the physician/non-physician test in an inter-
pretive rulings, but the school district's main concern is that the cost of providing health serv-
ices would be prohibitive and that it would take money away from other special education
programs. See id. Cedar Rapids concludes that claims which only consider the extent/nature
test allow schools greater flexibility. See id. The National School Board Association (NSBA)
supports the school board's positions in a brief reiterating the argument that the school districts
would be overwhelmed financially if they were required to provide nursing services. See
NSBA, Amicus Brief, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998 WL 546598
(1998).
221 986 F. Supp. 1112 (C.D. IM. 1997) [Morten 1].
222 Morton Community United Sch. Dist. v. J.M., 153 F.3d 583 (7' Cir. 1998) [Morten
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breathe through a ventilator and to require a tracheostomy and gastros-
tomy.223 For his first five years of school, J.M. attended public school
with a school-paid nurse and had no problems. When J.M.'s family
moved, his new school refused to provide him with the requested nursing
services. The school did not base its refusal on the financial burden 224 of
providing the services. Rather, the school maintained that it was prohib-
ited by law from providing the services. 225 J.M.'s parents brought a due
process hearing, where the administrative law judge held that the re-
quested services were related services that the school must provide.2 26
The district court affirmed the administrative law judge's decision
and interpreted Tatro as providing a bright-line test.227 The court ap-
provingly cited the reasoning of another district court in the Seventh Cir-
cuit that had rejected the extent/nature test.228 The court also explicitly
rejected the extent/nature test and criticized the reasoning of courts that
had adopted this test.229
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court, but the Seventh Circuit also realized that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to Garret F. and elected not to resolve the under-
lying issue.230 The court viewed the arguments of both parties as ex-
treme.231 The court noted that the family's view that "the sky is the
limit" on any medical services not provided by a doctor was not right,
while it also rejected the school's view that it only had to provide serv-
ices traditionally provided by a school nurse.232 The court felt that the
best solution was to allow school districts a defense of undue burden.2 33
The court recognized that, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the IDEA did not explicitly include such a defense, but the court
believed that such a defense is implicit in the Act.234 In applying this
test, the court held that the requested services in this case would not
223 Morton 1, 986 F. Supp. at 1115.
224 See id. at 1115. The school estimated that the cost of providing the requested nursing
services to J.M. would be about $20,000 per year out of their $16.8 million budget. See iU at
1115 n.2.
225 See id. at 1115.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 1123-24.
228 See id. at 1119 (citing Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch. Dist. 95, 968 F. Supp.
385 (N.D. M11. 997); see also infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text (discussing Skelly in
greater detail).
229 See id. at 1123-24.
230 See Morton II, 152 F.3d at 585.
231 See id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 586-87.
234 Id. at 586.
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cause an undue burden on the district.235 Thus, it appears that the Sev-
enth Circuit chose not to adopt one test over the other.
The Northern District of Illinois adopted the physician/non-physi-
cian test in Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park School District 95.236
Eddie Skelly was a student with a rare neurological-muscular disease
called Pelixaeus-Merzbacher Leukodystrophy. As a result of his disease,
he was developmentally delayed,237 used a wheelchair, and had gastroin-
testinal and tracheostomy tubes. Eddie requested that the school provide
nursing services for suctioning his tracheostomy on the bus ride to and
from school.238 The facts indicate, although there was some disagree-
ment, that a properly trained aide, and not only an LPN or RN, could
perform the services. 239
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals never
addressed the question presented in the case and looked to other circuit
courts' interpretations of Tatro for guidance.24 ° The Skelly family advo-
cated adoption of the physician/non-physician test followed by the
Eighth Circuit,241 while the school district argued for the adoption of the
extent/nature test used by the Sixth Circuit.24 2
In defending the bright-line test, the court first compared the factual
situations of the services requested in Garret F. and Neely to those in
Eddie's case and found:
Although the facts in each of these aforecited cases show
a greater burden on the respective school districts in-
volved than is shown in the present case and are, there-
fore, factually distinguishable from Eddie Skelly's
circumstance, this court declines to apply the burden test
here because this court believes that a bright-line test is
not only appropriate legally, but is necessary according
to public policy in order to further the efficient and
proper use of public funds earmarked for education.24 3
The court stated that education funds should be used for education
and not for litigation.24 The court also noted that litigation is disruptive
235 Id. at 587.
236 968 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. IM. 1997).
237 Although Eddie was developmentally delayed, he was interactive, loved being around
other people, and was motivated by being around other children. Id. at 388.
238 Eddie already received primarily one-on-one nursing during the school day from the
school nurse. Id. at 389.
239 See id.
240 See id. at 392.
241 See Cedar Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1997).
242 See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1995).
243 Skelly, 968 F. Supp. at 394 (emphasis added).
244 See id.
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to the child's education, as well as to the school's efficient operation and
courts have a duty to try to decrease this litigation, but "[w]ithout a hard
and fast bright-line test that is factually easy for school districts to apply,
litigation will continue to be spawned."2 45 The court cited this case as an
example of the problems resulting from an ambiguous rule and observed
that the school district was "bent on spending tens of thousands of dollars
on litigation to try to save a few hundred dollars on an aide to ride the
school bus with Eddie"246
The court also found that, as a matter of public policy, it is the
responsibility of courts to assist in the administration of the IDEA by
giving proper deference to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of the DOE.24 7 These regulations allow schools and parents to know
what is and is not covered by the IDEA without resorting to litigation.
The court believed that the extent/nature test did not give proper defer-
ence to the regulations. 24 8
After adopting the physician/non-physician test, the court stated that
tracheostomy suctioning is a common, standard procedure and does not
have to be performed by a doctor.249 It should not be excluded as a
medical service, even if a nurse is required to perform the procedure.25 0
The court, therefore, held that the requested service was a related service
that the school must provide.
The First Circuit has yet to rule on this issue. State DOE hearing
officers in the First Circuit, however, disagree over which test the circuit
would adopt. Based on other decisions by the First Circuit in the special
education area, a number of judges and administrative hearing officers
believe the First Circuit would probably reject the nature/extent test.25 1
A hearing officer in the Massachusetts DOE used the physician/non-phy-
sician test in Tewksbury Public Schools.252 The student, Christopher K.,
was a quadriplegic and had a tracheostomy tube. Christopher had aca-
demic skills commensurate with students his own age, and he had the
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See id
248 See id. at 394-95.
249 See i& at 395
250 See id
251 See, e.g., Tewksbury Public Schools, 17 EHLR 1221, 1231 (SEA Mass. 1991). Other
courts in the First Circuit required schools to provide nursing services, although not explicitly
adopting a particular test. See, e.g., Kevin G. v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 965 F. Supp. 261
(D.R.I. 1997), aff'd 130 F.3d 481 (1- Cir. 1997) (holding that school district mist provide
nursing services to student with tracheostomy, but that the services did not have to be provided
at his home school); Rhode Island Dep't of Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Warwick Sch.
Comm., 696 A.2d 281 (R.I. 1997) (holding that a school must provide nursing service to a
student with a tracheostomy tube, but that the nurse did not have to be a certified nurse-
teacher).
252 See Tewksbury, 17 EHLR at 1229.
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capacity and motivation to attend college and to obtain employment as
an adult. To attend school, however, Christopher required nursing serv-
ices to provide tracheal suctioning and monitoring Christopher requested
these services. 253
The hearing officer noted that, due to Christopher's disability, his
medical and educational needs were intertwined.254 Looking to Tatro for
guidance in determining whether health services are related or excluded,
the officer held that the services requested by Christopher met both
prongs of the Tatro test. First, the services were supportive, since Chris-
topher could not attend school without them.255 Second, the officer in-
terpreted Tatro to "look to the training and licensure of the person
providing the supportive service to determine whether it met the statutory
definition of a related service. '256 The hearing officer concluded that
services provided by a nurse are "not subject to exclusion as 'medical
services." 257 The officer, therefore, held that the requested nursing
services must be provided as a part of a FAPE for Christopher. 258
The hearing officer also noted that other courts interpreted Tatro as
requiring an inquiry into the extent and nature of the service, but rejected
this reasoning as it "impos[ed] a criterion additional to that stated by the
Supreme Court in Tatro for determining whether health services are re-
lated to a handicapped student's education." 259 The court quoted a deci-
sion that rejected the extent/nature line of cases:
The difficulty this court has with both Detsel and Bevin
are [sic] their failure to adhere to certain principles de-
veloped in Tatro.... Rather, Detsel concludes that while
the disputed services did not actually meet the statutory
and regulatory definition of medical services, given that
the regulation specifically addressed physician-per-
formed services, denying the services 'is in keeping with
[the regulation's] spirit.' Th[is] Court, however, be-
lieves that this conclusion ignores the spirit of the [EHA]
itself. As Tatro repeatedly stressed, the reason for man-
253 See id. at 1222. Christopher K. had been attending the Kennedy Day School at Fran-
ciscan Children's Hospital. Christopher, however, applied to the Massachusetts Hospital
School because it offered an academic program where he could get his high school diploma.
Massachusetts Hospital School accepted him to the program on the condition that he provide a
one-on-one licensed health care professional. See id. at 1222-23.
254 See id. at 1226.
255 See id. at 1228
256 Id.
257 See id.
258 See id. The court also said its finding was buttressed by the Massachusetts law that
specifically, and without regard to qualification, held nursing services to be a related service.
See 603 C.M.R. § 28, 503.1.
259 Id. at 1229.
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dating the provision of supportive services under the
[EHA] is to guarantee handicapped students an opportu-
nity to gain an education. If granting such an opportu-
nity entails furnishing medically-related services short of
requiring a licensed physician, we believe such services
are the student's right. Moreover, the [EHA], its legisla-
tive history, and its regulations are void of any sugges-
tion that states are free to decide, on the basis of the cost
and effort required, which related services fall within the
medical services exclusion. Th[is] Court therefore re-
jects Detsel's conclusion that services provided by a
nurse, no matter how comprehensive, are medical serv-
ices entitled to exclusion under the [EHA].260
As there was no case directly on point in the First Circuit, the of-
ficer looked to the circuit's most recent decision interpreting special edu-
cation statutes for guidance on how the circuit court might decide the
issue.261 Based in part upon the Timothy W. decision and "[g]iven the
first [sic] Circuit's commitment of access to educational services for all
handicapped students, and its strict reading of the Federal special educa-
tional law's language," the hearing officer stated that he "expect[ed] that
the [Circuit] Court would approve of the reasoning" of the physician/
non-physician decisions and not the extent/nature decisions. 262 The re-
quested service, therefore, was a related service and the school was re-
quired to provide the service to Christopher.
On the other hand, another decision from the Massachusetts DOE
reached the opposite result. In Hopedale School District,263 the hearing
officer determined that nursing services to provide suctioning, monitor-
ing, and CIC to a quadriplegic child were excluded medical services.
The officer interpreted Tatro as requiring an inquiry into the nature and
extent of services requested. Since the situation was similar to that of
Detsel, the court held that the requested services were excluded as medi-
cal services. 264
The officer also based her interpretation of the state laws and regu-
lations on "common sense and reasonableness. '265 In interpreting the
relevant statutes and regulations, the officer stated:
260 Id. (quoting Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824,
826 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citations omitted)).
261 See Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H. Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1 Cir. 1989) (holding
that a disabled child does not have to demonstrate that he can benefit from special education in
order to be eligible for that education).
262 See Tewksbury, 17 EHLR at 1229.
263 17 EHLR 973 (Mass. SEA 1991).
264 See i at 977-78.
265 Id. at 978.
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"nursing services" have traditionally and consistently
meant those services that are normally, on a day-to-day
basis, delivered by a school nurse to the general popula-
tion of students: administering medications with parental
consent; evaluation of medical records and medical con-
ditions; checking for head lice; screening for scoliosis,
vision, and hearing; health education; first aid; etc.266
The officer decided that the requested services fell outside of this tradi-
tional scope, and, therefore, were not required related services. 2 67
The remaining circuits have either not made any decisions in the
area or have not clearly indicated the test upon which they will rely
on.268 There is, however, clearly a division between the circuits on the
proper interpretation of Tatro. The courts adopting the extent/nature test
expanded upon Tatro's dicta to create a balancing test of a number of
factors in order to determine whether a nursing service is a related ser-
vice.269 The courts adopting the bright-line test relied upon the language
of Tatro to create a standard in which the qualifications of the provider
are determinative of whether the requested nursing service is a related
service.270 An analysis of the rationale and application of both tests
shows that neither test leads to meaningful and appropriate results in
light of the language of the IDEA, its regulations, and its policy.
1H. CRITIQUE OF EXTENT/NATURE STANDARD
Courts are split on how to determine whether a nursing service is a
covered related service or an excluded medical service. Because there is
no clear rule, parents and school districts end up in court far too often.
Children with similar needs are either allowed in or kept out of school
simply depending on the district in which they live. An analysis of both
standards under several relevant factors leads to the conclusion that the
266 Id.
267 See id. at 978-79.
268 No decisions were found on point in the Fourth or Eleventh Circuits. The Fifth Circuit
appeared to use a bright-line type of test when it held the school responsible for providing
nursing services to a student. See Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, appealed after remand, 703
F.2d 823 (5ti Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part in Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468
U.S. 883 (1984). In a later case, a state hearing officer analyzed a related service under both
the physician/non-physician and the extentlnature tests and ruled in favor of the student. See
Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 25 IDELR 1023, 1025-26 (SEA Tx. 1997).
269 See, e.g., Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (D. Utah 1992)
(examining cost, complexity, and time for requested services); Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.
Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (examining cost, complexity, and time for the requested
procedure).
270 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8"h Cir.
1997) (examining whether provider was physician or non-physician); Skelly v. Brookfield
LaGrange Park Sch. Dist. 95, 968 F. Supp. 385, 394 (N.D. IM. 1997) (examining whether
provider was a physician or non-physician).
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extent/nature test is not the correct interpretation of Tatro and the rele-
vant IDEA provisions.
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The extent/nature test is incorrect in light of the rules of statutory
construction. Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the
statute itself and statutes should be read according to the "ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning" of the words used.271 When the statutory
language is clear and does not contradict clearly expressed legislative
intent, the language controls.272 In this case, the language of the IDEA
does not clearly state whether the types of nursing services required by
children with special health needs are related services.273
If the meaning of the statute is not clear on its face, the court should
then look to the relevant administrative agency's construction of the stat-
ute.274 If Congressional intent on the issue is clear, the courts and
agency must give effect to the "unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress." 275 In enacting the related services provision, Congress merely set
out a broad principle that the provision of related services to disabled
children is a necessary part of a FAPE.2 7 6 In the case of nursing serv-
ices, Congress did not unambiguously state in the statute or legislative
history whether nursing services are related services or excluded medical
services. Congress did list a limited number of common related serv-
ices.277 The Secretary of the DOE has not, however, interpreted this list
to be exhaustive.278
Courts look to any agency regulations to fill in gaps when Congress
has not directly adequately addressed the issue.279 The courts must ex-
amine whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.280 The courts need not determine that the
agency's interpretation was the only permissible interpretation or that it
271 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
272 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court ... must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
273 See IDEA, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998). The language of the IDEA does not spe-
cifically mention nursing services.
274 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
275 Id. at 842.
276 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8), (22) (1998).
277 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1998) (listing related services include transportation, physi-
cal therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy).
278 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (1997) ("the term 'includes' means that the items named are not
all of the possible items that are covered ... ").
279 See Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843; see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
280 See Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843. Furthermore, if an agency regulation exists, a court is
not allowed to simply impose its own construction on the statute as it would do if there was no
administrative interpretation. See id.
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was the interpretation that the court would have reached.281 Rather, the
administrative regulations are "given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. '282
The Secretary of the DOE established regulations to define the
scope of related services and the medical services exclusion. The Secre-
tary defined school health services, which he specially noted as covering
related services, to mean those services provided by a qualified school
nurse or other trained layperson. 283 Moreover, the Secretary defined
medical services as those "services provided by a licensed physician to
determine a child's medically related disability that results in the child's
need for special education and related services. '284 The Supreme Court
in Tatro held that the Secretary's definitions were "a reasonable interpre-
tation of congressional intent."285 The Tatro court also held that, by lim-
iting the medical services exclusion to the services of a physician, "the
Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provision. '286 The
DOE regulations, therefore, must be given deference.
The Secretary distinguished between covered school health services
and excluded medical services based on the qualifications of the person
providing the service.287 Proper deference to the agency regulations re-
quires that the test for excludable medical services follow the same
scheme. Notably, the extent/nature test does not follow this scheme.
It has been argued that Congress ratified the Secretary's interpreta-
tion in the 1983 amendments to the EHA. 288 In 1982, the Secretary of
the DOE proposed narrowing the related services provision.289 The pro-
posed revisions would have broadened the exclusions of medical serv-
ices. Members of Congress opposed the changes to the related-services
regulation,290 and the Secretary eventually withdrew the changes. 29'
Congress responded to the Secretary's actions by adding a new section to
the EHA, providing that the Secretary of the DOE could not implement
regulations that lessened the procedural or substantive protections of dis-
281 See id. at 843 n.11 (citing cases).
282 Id. at 843.
283 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a), b)(ll) (1997).
284 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1997).
285 Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
286 Id at 893.
287 Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4), (11).
288 Prior to 1990, IDEA was referred to as the Education of Handicapped Act (EHA).
Garret F. argued this position to the Supreme Court with the Department of Justice and the
disability organizations writing in support of Garret. See DOJ, Amicus Brief, 1998 WL
541989 (1998); Family Voices, Amicus Brief, 1998 WL 541990 (1998).
289 See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (1982).
290 See, e.g., 128 Cong. Rec. 20, 620, 21, 793 (1982); H.R. 906, 9 8' Cong.
291 See 47 Fed. Reg. 49,871 (1982).
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abled students without clear instruction from Congress. 292 These actions,
however, are of limited use in determining Congressional intent, since
they occurred prior to Tatro, and Congress has not clarified the language
of the provision after such cases as Detsel.
Although agency regulations are an appropriate resource for statu-
tory interpretation, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary do not
fully answer the question of the scope of nursing service. The regula-
tions define "school health services" as those health services that must be
provided to students,2 93 but do not specifically state which medical serv-
ices are excluded. The regulations do not clearly determine if there are
any limits to the types of nursing services that schools must provide to
students.
The controversy regarding the scope of nursing services exists
largely because the Secretary has not spoken on the subject. The Secre-
tary could easily solve the problem by clarifying the regulations or by
writing a policy letter on the subject, but the Secretary has not provided a
methodology for courts to use, and in its absence, courts developed their
own tests. By failing to clearly define the scope of covered nursing serv-
ices, the Secretary failed to protect many children with special health
care needs.
B. RATIONALE OF THE EXTENT/NATURE TEST
Courts have stated a number of reasons for accepting the extent/
nature test over the bright-line physician/non-physician test. These ratio-
nales include such factors as cost, liability, expertise, medical nature,
complexity and training, intensity, number of services, and traditional
roles.294 When nursing services are analyzed and compared with other
covered related services, these arguments do not justify the adoption of
the extent/nature test.
1. Cost
The cases adopting the extent/nature relied on the high costs of
nursing services. Some courts determined that the high costs of nursing
services place a burden on school districts that is very similar to the bur-
den created by the medical services the IDEA excludes.295 The cost
292 20 U.S.C. § 1407(b), recodified.as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1998) (specifying
"particularly as such provisions relate to ... related services).
293 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a).
294 See, e.g., Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D. N.J.
1996); Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 971 (6"' Cir. 1995) (stating that it is
appropriate to take into account the risk involved and the potential exposure of the school);
EHA Policy Letter of March 25, 1988, 213 EHA 118-21.
295 See, e.g., Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.N.J.
1996) (holding that requiring the school to pay for the requested nursing service was an undue
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should not be an appropriate factor in determining whether a nursing
service is related.
Congress realized that mandating the provision of education to dis-
abled children would be expensive. 296 In fact, Congress realized that the
lack of funding was one of the main reasons that disabled children were
not receiving an appropriate education.2 97 As a result, Congress set up a
funding system for the provision of special education through the
IDEA.298
Senate members noted cases stating that "lack of funding may not
be used as an excuse for failing to provide educational services. '2 99
Congress reaffirmed the proposition from Mills, that insufficient funding
cannot be used as an excuse and "certainly cannot be permitted to bear
more heavily on the 'exceptional' child or handicapped child than the
burden because of the high costs); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Sujp. 1020, 1029-
30 (D. Utah 1992) (denying nursing services, in part, because "[t]he expense of providing
Shannon's requested care would undoubtedly take money away from other programs."); Bevin
H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1987) (holding requested service to be
so varied, intensive and costly as to be an excluded medical service). The Detsel court was the
first to bring cost in as a factor. See Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-27
(excluding requested nursing services in part because they were costly). It is worth noting,
however, that the Auburn Enlarged City School District did not explicitly use cost as a basis
for its argument:
THE COURT: What would be the cost to the School District of providing this type
of service? I don't have in fiont of me anything other than just general allegations
that it would be prohibitive.
MR. HOOKS: I'm not - well, your honor, I am not arguing the expense is necessar-
ily prohibitive.
THE COURT: Isn't that a factor? You are not citing that as a factor in this case?
MR. HOOKS: I'm saying the sole factor in this situation is whether or not the type
of services that we are looking to are the type of services which under the Education
for Handicapped Children Act we are required to provide. I am putting to the side
for the moment, the question of expense, whether the expense in this particular in-
stance is-I really can't speak to that, your Honor.
THE COURT: You are not arguing the economic-
MR. HOOKS: I am not arguing the economics.
Record at 6-7, Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1022.
296 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 94-168, 12-13 (1975); reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1436-37 (recognizing that the actual cost of educating a child with a disability was, on aver-
age, at least twice as much as educating a non-disabled child.).
297 See id at 7 ("In recent years, decisions in more than 36 court cases in the States have
recognized the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education. States have made
an effort to comply; however, lack of financial resources have prevented the implementation of
the various decisions which have been rendered.").
298 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (1998).
299 See S. REP. No. 94-168, 8-9 (1975); reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430,
1432-33. Congress mentioned that this proposition was also espoused by the court in Mills v.
Board. of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). Congress noted that "[t]he failure
to fulfill this clear duty to include and retain these children in the public school system, or
otherwise provide them with publicly-supported education... cannot be excused by the claim
that there are insufficient funds." S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6.
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normal child. °300 The Supreme Court in Rowley reaffirmed the right of
access to a free public education for all children with disabilities and
stated that a lack of funds cannot be used to entirely exclude a disabled
child from receiving a publicly supported education.30'
Furthermore, the IDEA provides for a FAPE for all children, regard-
less of the severity of their disability.3 2 Congress directed that priority
should be given to children with the most severe disabilities who are not
receiving an adequate education.303 The Third Circuit noted that Con-
gress "intended to offset any budgetary incentives to deal initially with
the least afflicted and provide for the least expensive services first, since
state receipt of money under the Act is conditioned on the number of
handicapped children served regardless of their need. °304 Consequently,
cost alone cannot be the determinative factor in the quality FAPE a child
receives.
a. Cost As A Factor Only In Limited Contexts
Cost is only properly considered as a factor in two circumstances.
First, cost may be relevant when choosing between two equally appropri-
ate methods of providing related services. 305 Second, cost has a limited
role in determining whether and to what extent a child should be main-
streamed or should receive a residential placement.306
Cost may be relevant when determining the proper method for pro-
viding a related service. If a particular related service can be provided in
two different ways, each providing an appropriate education the school
may choose the least costly alternative.30 7 Cost considerations, however,
are only relevant when choosing between several equally appropriate op-
tions.308 For example, if the school could provide the appropriate neces-
sary related service through either an aide or a trained professional, the
school may choose to hire the less expensive aide. But, the cases regard-
ing nursing services are not about who can provide these services; they
300 See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8-9.
301 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982) (relying on Mills, 348 Supp. at 876,
and Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D.
Pennsylvania 1971)).
302 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(A), 1412(a)(3)(A), 1400(d)(1)(A) (1998).
303 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1997). The 1997 amendments mandate that all children with
disabilities must be identified and provided a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(3)(A), (1)(A)
(1998).
304 Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 n.21 (3 ,d Cir. 1981).
305 See, e.g., Clevenger v. Oakridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984).
306 See, e.g., Sacramento City United Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9h Cir.
1994).
307 See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HuM, . . .AND EDUCATION FOR ALL: PUBLIC PoL-
icy AND HANDIcAPPED CHiLDREN 67-68 (1987).
308 See Clevenger, 744 F.2d at 517.
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are about whether or not these services must be provided at all. Thus,
cost is not pertinent to the availability of related services discussion for
children with special health care needs.
Cost may also be relevant to placement decisions. A school is re-
quired to place a child with a disability in the least restrictive environ-
ment.30 9 The IDEA specifically states that, if possible, disabled children
should be mainstreamed in school with nondisabled children. 310 "Spe-
cial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabil-
ities from the regular educational environment [should] occur[ ] only
when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily .... ,,311 For children with special health care
needs, nursing services fall into the category of "supplementary aids and
services" that should be provided.
A number of factors are relevant in determining whether a child can
be mainstreamed satisfactorily. First, the court must examine the educa-
tional benefits available to a child in the regular classroom, supple-
mented with appropriate aids and services, as compared to the
educational benefits of a non-mainstreamed placement.312 Second, the
court must look at the non-academic benefits to the disabled child from
interaction with non-disabled peers.313 Third, the court must look at the
effect of the presence of the disabled child on the teacher and the rest of
the class. 314 Finally, the court may look at cost.315
309 20 U.S.C.A. §1412(a)(5) (1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1996).
310 20 U.S.C.A. §1412(a)(5) (1998).
311 ICE "The Act does not permit states to make mere token gestures to accommodate
handicapped students; its requirement for modifying and supplementing regular education is
broad." Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5 Cir. 1989). "In a case
where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the
services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated
setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the
Act." Roncker v. Walter, 500 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6h Cir. 1983).
312 See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047, 1048; Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
313 See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047-48.
314 See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049.
315 See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.
1994); Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. A number of courts, however, state that cost is a factor that
is not relevant to any inquiry. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d
687, 695 (3 d Cir. 1981) (interpreting the EHA as requiring schools to "provide a comprehen-
sive range of services to accommodate a handicapped child's educational needs, regardless of
financial and administrative burdens .. ") (emphasis added); North Allegheny Sch. Dist. v.
Gregory P., 687 A.2d 37, 39 (Pennsylvania Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding that if a related ser-
vice was an integral part of a student's special education needs, then a district must provide the
related service even if it would impose a substantial burden on the district); D.S. v. Bd. of Ed.,
458 A.2d 129, 139 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (rejecting lack of federal reimbursement
funds as an excuse for providing FAPE's to disabled children).
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The cost of supplementary aids and services necessary to main-
stream the disabled child in the regular classroom is a relevant factor.316
The cost inquiry must be limited.317 Although a school does not have to
provide every single possible service to a child, "this is not to say that a
school district may decline to educate a child in a regular classroom be-
cause the cost of doing so, with the appropriate supplemental aids and
services, would be incrementally more expensive than educating the
child" in a non-mainstreamed environment.318
Cost considerations, however, may only be a factor in placement
when the school district must make appropriate cost comparisons. 319
The school district bears the burden of presenting the appropriate cost
comparisons. 320 If the district does not present the proper cost compari-
sons, then the court will refuse to take cost into consideration.321
Cost considerations are only appropriate when choosing between
two equally appropriate alternatives. 322 "Cost can be a legitimate consid-
eration when devising an appropriate program for individual students.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit noted that while cost may be a legitimate
factor in developing a student's education plan, "cost considerations are
only relevant when choosing between several options, all of which offer
an 'appropriate' education. When only one is appropriate, there is no
choice."323
The degree to which a child is restricted is also relevant in determin-
ing appropriate cost comparisons. The cost of total mainstreaming must
316 See, e.g., Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (119, Cir. 1991).
317 See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
318 Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
319 See, e.g., Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (holding that cost can be a factor in mainstream-
ing questions when comparing two equally appropriate placements); Cremeans v. Fairland
Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 633 NE.2d 570, 581 (1993) (holding that cost can be a factor in
mainstreaming questions if appropriate cost comparisons are made).
320 See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1402; Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517
(60' Cir. 1984).
321 See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1402. The school merely presented evidence of how expen-
sive it would be to mainstream the student. It did not make a comparison between the cost to
mainstream her in a regular classroom and place her in a special education classroom in the
same school (which was the least restrictive environment alternative).
By inflating the cost estimates and failing to address the true comparison, the District
did not meet its burden of proving that regular placement would burden the District's
funds or adversely affect services available to other children. Therefore, the court
found that the cost factor did not weigh against mainstreaming Rachel.
IL
322 See Clevenger, 744 F.2d at 517; see also Cremeans, 633 N.E.2d at 581(holding cost
was not a relevant factor even through the program cost $94,000 per year, because it was the
only appropriate placement); WEnmR & Humz, supra note 307, at 67 (stating that even where
cost is great, courts must consider the appropriateness of differently priced options; cost con-
siderations are only appropriate when choosing between several appropriate options).
323 Clevenger, 744 F.2d at 517 (emphasis added).
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be compared with the least restrictive appropriate environment. 324 For
example, it would be inappropriate for the school to compare the cost of
mainstreaming with a very restrictive (but cheaper) environment or with
the provision of no education. Additionally, cost cannot be a defense if
the school district has not used its funds to provide a proper continuum
of alternative placements for students with disabilities. 325 For example,
it is not appropriate for a school to provide either total mainstreaming or
a home-bound education but nothing in between these options.
The least restrictive environment test reflects the belief that children
with special health care needs should be educated in school whenever
reasonably possible. Children with special health care needs receive aca-
demic benefits by being in school. For example, being around other chil-
dren their age increases their cognitive and language development. 32 6
Furthermore, there are numerous non-academic benefits to children with
special health care needs when mainstreamed in school. The benefits of
interaction with peers include learning social and communication skills,
modeling appropriate behavior, and gaining self-confidence. 32 7 In-
creased health performance is another extremely important additional
non-academic benefit for children with special health care needs. Scien-
tific studies have shown an association between relationships and
health.328
The effect of the disabled child on the class also weighs in favor of
placing children with special health care needs in schools. In measuring
this factor, a court should keep in mind that the school has an obligation
to provide supplementary aids and services to accommodate a disabled
child. Provision of aids and services as part of an individualized educa-
tion plan may prevent disruptions that may occur otherwise.329 A dis-
abled child merely requiring more teacher attention than most other
students is not the type of disruption that should be used to exclude chil-
dren from the classroom. 330 Courts have also noted that there are recip-
rocal benefits to mainstreaming. For example, the Third Circuit noted
that "[t]eaching nondisabled children to work and communicate with
children with disabilities may do much to eliminate the stigma, mistrust
324 See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1402.
325 WEwER & HUmE, supra note 307, at 67.
326 Testimony of Gregory Liptak, M.D. at 15, In re Melissa Detsel, 506 EHLR 378 (SEA
N.Y. 1985).
327 See, e.g., Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1401.
328 See, e.g., James S. House et al., Social Relationships and Health, SCMNCE, July 29,
1988, at 540 ("More socially isolated or less socially integrated individuals are less healthy,
psychologically and physically, and more likely to die.").
329 See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993).
330 See id. (quoting Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11' h Cir. 1991)).
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and hostility that have traditionally been harbored against people with
disabilities. '331
Considering the above, cost considerations should not keep these
children out of the schools. In fact, cost issues should not arise at all for
children with special health care needs because there simply are no
equally appropriate alternatives. When courts have decided that nursing
services are excluded medical services, they have implied that the alter-
native to education in the classroom is education through home-bound
tutoring.332 It is, however, inappropriate to weigh the costs of at-school
instruction with nursing services against home-bound instruction unless
they are equally appropriate alternatives. Home instruction and school
placement are not equally appropriate, as evidenced by the IDEA least
restrictive environment mandates. Even if the exact same educational
program (including related services) is implemented, a child does not
receive many of the benefits at home that he would receive if he were at
school. When a child is placed at home, he is in the most restrictive
environment. He has no contact with peers, disabled or non-disabled.
All of the academic and non-academic benefits of mainstreaming are lost
when the child is educated at home. As a result, mainstreaming and
home placement cannot be considered equally appropriate alternatives.
If the choice is between mainstreaming and home placement, cost
should, therefore, be completely rejected as a factor in placement deci-
sions for children with special health care needs.
In addition, the nursing services cases relying on cost do not make
appropriate cost comparisons because they do not take into account the
cost of an appropriate residential placement.333 Even if it is determined
that home-placement is the appropriate placement, the courts must re-
member that home-placement is very expensive.334 Although it is clearly
cheaper not to provide any related services, the provision of a related
service may be required to make a placement appropriate.335 If the
school is unable to provide a FAPE to the child with supplementary aids
and services in the school, then the school may be forced to pay for a
residential placement for the child, which would be much more expen-
331 Id. at 1217 n.24.
332 See, e.g., Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (D. Utah 1992);
Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.N.Y 1986).
333 No cases adopting the extent/nature test compared the cost of providing the service
with residential placement. The decisions merely stated the cost of providing the services
without providing comparison. See infra Part mII.B.l.b.i. (for discussion).
334 Even if it is determined that home-bound education is the least restrictive environ-
ment, a school is still required to provide special education and related services to that child as
part of his FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1998).
335 See id. (free appropriate education includes special education and necessary related
services).
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sive than providing nursing services in school.336 This occurs because
the same related services that would be provided to the child in school
must also be provided to the home-bound student as part of the child's
education. Thus, the true costs of an appropriate residential placement
may be far greater than the costs of providing the disabled child with
nursing services in the school.
A number of courts adopting the extent/nature test also justify not
providing nursing services to children with special health care needs
based on Rowley, which held that schools must only provide a minimum
floor of opportunity and not the best possible education.337 Courts
adopting the extent/nature test and who look at cost as a factor have
justified not providing nursing services by stating that the school is not
required to provide the maximum or best environment.338 Unfortunately,
the reliance on Rowley is misplaced. The question raised in Rowley did
not involve determining the least restrictive environment for the child.
Rather, the Rowley test assumes that the school has already met the
mainstreaming requirements.339 Rowley cannot be read to provide a ba-
sis for denying nursing services when a school has not satisfied main-
streaming requirements. If the school has not met mainstreaming
requirements, then the Rowley "minimum floor" test does not apply and
the school must satisfy the least restrictive environment test.34° The cost
of providing nursing services, therefore, cannot justify the adoption of
the extent/nature test. As indicated above, cost never becomes a factor
for children with special health care needs with regard to related services,
placement decisions or under Rowley.
336 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.554 (1997).
337 See, e.g., Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (D. Utah 1992)
(stating that the school met the minimum floor of opportunity by providing homebound in-
struction rather than providing nursing services in order for the child to attend school); Bevin
H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1987) (holding that schools are not
required to provide the best education without regard to expense); Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637
F. Supp.1022, 1027 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that providing homebound instruction, rather
than providing nursing services so the child could attend, could meet the minimum floor of
opportunity required by Rowley).
338 See supra note 337 (for examples).
339 In Rowley, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test to determine whether a school
has provided a student with a FAPE: first, the court must determine whether the school com-
plied with the procedures of the EHA; and second, is the IEP reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits. 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). Courts determined,
however, that this test is not appropriate for determining whether a school met its mainstream-
ing requirements. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Ed., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5 " Cir. 1989);
A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (81h Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700
F.2d 1058, 1062 (66' Cir. 1983). It is often the case that "[t]he Rowley test assumes that the
state has met all of the requirements of the Act, including the mainstreaming requirement. The
Rowley test thus assumes the answer to the question presented in a mainstreaming case."
Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045.
340 See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044; A.W., 813 F.2d at 163; and Roncker, 700 F.2d at
1062.
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b. Realistic Estimation of Costs
i. Over-Estimation of Costs by Cases
The cases do not give a realistic estimation of costs. For example,
in Fulginiti, the school district estimated that it would cost them $56,000
to provide a student with nursing services, including tracheostomy suc-
tioning, gastronomy feeding, and constant monitoring.3 41 Although the
court accepted this figure, it is unclear whether it was based upon the
salary of an RN, LPN, or aide. In any case, the number may be exagger-
ated. The median salary for an RN was $682 per week in 1994.342 If the
RN was paid a yearly salary, she would only earn $34,100. If she was
hired for the school year only, her salary would total $23,870.343 The
median weekly earnings of a full-time salaried LPN were $450 in
1994.344 Even if a LPN worked year-round for the school, her salary
would only be $22,500.345 It is much more likely that an LPN would
only work about 35 weeks of the year, earning a salary of $15,750. A
trained aid would earn even less. Thus, it seems that the court based its
cost assumptions in Fulginiti upon possibly exaggerated estimates.
In Shannon M., the court accepted the school's estimate of $30,000
per year for nursing services. 346 This estimate was based upon the cost
for a LPNfor three hours per day. A full-time, year-round salaried LPN
would only earn $22,500, and a full-time LPN that was paid based upon
the school year would only earn $15,750. Again, the Shannon M. court
appears to have based its cost justifications upon potentially exaggerated
figures. The Neely case gives more realistic figures of cost. In that case,
Samantha needed a nurse to provide monitoring, suctioning, and emer-
gency care as necessary. The district court concluded that the school
could provide Samantha with a full-time attendant for a base salary be-
tween $10,640 and $13,680. 347 This figure is possibly a more accurate
measure of the salary of an LPN assisting a child during school hours.
The school district in Morton Community348 also gives realistic cost
figures. In order to attend school, J.M. needed a full-time nurse to pro-
vide monitoring, suctioning, and emergency care as necessary. The Sev-
341 See Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D.N.J. 1996).
342 U.S. DP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLooK HANDBOOK 175 (1997).
343 Based upon a salary of $682 per week for 50 paid weeks.
344 See id at 209.
345 Based upon $450 per week for 50 paid weeks.
346 See Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp.1020, 1029 (D. Utah 1992).
347 See Neely v. Rutherford County. Sch., 851 F. Supp. 888, 894 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
Although the Sixth Circuit reversed upon appeal, the court specifically noted that the undue
burden upon the school district "derives from the nature of the care involved rather than from
the salary of the person performing it." l at 971.
348 Morton 11, 153 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998).
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals found that these private, full-time nursing
services could be provided to J.M. for about $20,000 per year.349
ii. Small Numbers and No Woodwork Effect
One underlying concern about cost is that schools will be forced to
pay for nursing services for a large number of children. The rationale is
that if the school district pays for nursing services for one child, then lots
of children will ask the school to pay for their nursing services.350
First, the courts may be overestimating the total burden on the
school district. Out of the over eight million disabled children qualifying
for special education,351 the estimates of technology-dependent children
only range from 2,300 to 17,000.352 Since technology-dependent stu-
dents are less than 0.21 percent of the total disabled student popula-
tion,353 it appears that school districts over-emphasize the potential
burden of providing nursing services to these students.3 54
Secondly, there is also an underlying concern that there are a larger
number of technology-dependent children than the schools currently real-
ize. Schools and courts are cautious about making a broad policy deci-
sion to provide these new benefits because of this potential "woodwork
349 See ia- The court also noted that:
[t]he school district has made no effort to show that the expense of a full-time nurse
for J.M. would be undue in relation to the other calls on the district's budget. The
district has more than 3,000 students, so that the annual cost of such a nurse would
be less than $7 per student.
Ld. at 587.
350 See, e.g., Report to Congress, supra note 13, at 9.
351 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1) (1997)(stating that as of 1997, there were more than eight
million children with disabilities in the United States).
352 OFFicE oF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, TECHNOLOGY-DEPENDENT CHILDREN: Hospi-
TAL V. HoME CARE-A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 4 (1987).
353 This percentage assumed eight million disabled students.
354 Garret F. addressed this issue in his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court:
All the litigated cases involving health monitoring in a regular classroom involve
children who rely on ventilators and/or tracheotomy tubes for breathing. The con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that in any given year
there are between 680 and 2,000 children 21 years old and under who receive venti-
lator assistance. [citations omitted]. OTA also estimated that between 1,000 and
6,000 additional children under 21 breathe with the assistance of tracheotomy tubes.
OTA's numbers overestimate the population relevant to school districts in two re-
spects. First, they cover infants and toddlers (that is, children age 0-2) who do not
receive school services and who may be weaned from the ventilator or tracheotomy
by the time they are ready to enter school [citations omitted]. Second, they include
children living in hospitals who receive health services from hospitals not school
districts ..... Thus the number of ventilator- and tracheotomy-dependent children
who attend school and require ventilator/tracheotomy health services is likely at the
lower end of the OTA estimates.... In any event, that population constitutes the
barest fraction of the 5.6 million children currently receiving special education and
related services.
Resp. Brief, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 1998 WL 541985 n. 10.
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effect."355 This is created by "the concern that the known beneficiaries
of a new benefit might only be a small portion of the total eligible popu-
lation. '356 The Task Force Report stated that the woodwork effect is
unlikely to occur with the population of technology-dependent children,
because "the severity of their condition make[s] it unlikely that they
would be unknown to tertiary medical care facilities in their area. '357 As
a result, the small number of known technology-dependent children in
the school systems are probably an accurate measure of the number of
children who require the nursing services in question. The courts and
schools, therefore, may be over-emphasizing the true possible burdens on
schools in the extent/nature test.
iii. Medicaid
Medicaid funding can relieve at least a part of the school district's
responsibility for nursing services for children with special health care
needs. 358 Prior to 1991, Medicaid maintained a policy which provided
that when a child received Medicaid private nursing services in his home,
the child could not bring that nurse to school.359 After being denied
nursing services under the EHA, Melissa Detsel brought a suit against
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to challenge
this Medicaid restriction.360 Although Medicaid provided Melissa full-
time private duty nursing services while she was at home,361 it would not
allow her to bring her nurse to school.
The Second Circuit determined that the HHS Secretary's interpreta-
tion of the Medicaid at-home regulation as a limitation on private-duty
nursing was unreasonable. 362 First, although at the time the regulation
was promulgated it might have been common understanding that private-
duty nursing could be provided only at home, the evolution of medical
science has changed this assumption.363 Technology that would allow a
child like Melissa to leave her home or institutionalized setting did not
exist in 1965. With this change in technology, the common understand-
355 See REPORT To CONGRESS, supra note 13, at 9.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 It is not automatic that a school or a state is able to be reimbursed by Medicaid for
nursing services-a school or state must enter into inter-agency agreements. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(c). If a state chose not to apply, it would be the school's own fault that the cost of
providing nursing services to disabled students is too high. It would be a cost-defense killer
for a school or state not to at least apply for the Medicaid reimbursement program.
359 See Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing interpretation letter
by Health and Human Services concerning 42 C.F.R. § 440.80).
360 See id.
361 Melissa qualified for private duty nursing under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(8) (1997). See
id at 61.
362 42 C.F.R. § 440.80 (1997).
363 See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 63-64.
19981
182 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc POLICY [Vol. 8:135
ing that private-duty nursing was only to be provided at home "would not
necessarily remain reasonable today."'364 In fact, the court held that pri-
vate-duty nursing is now commonly understood as being independent of
any particular setting, and that private-duty nursing only referred to the
level of care and not to the specific location where the care is
provided.365
The court also determined that the limitation was not reasonable
based on administrative efficiency or any line-drawing process that is
part of allocating the limited resources among welfare programs.3 66 The
Detsel court noted:
[T]he secretary fails to show how the at-home limitation
furthers any of the department's legitimate fiscal con-
cerns. Medicaid pays for all the supplies and equipment
that Melissa needs, whether she remains at home the en-
tire day or attends school, and provides a private duty
nurse around the clock in her home. Refusing to permit
the nurse to accompany Melissa to school in effect con-
fines Melissa to her home. But this saves no money, be-
cause Medicaid would still be responsible for paying for
the nurse and for all supplies and equipment while Me-
lissa remained at home. Moreover, since the state will
be required to furnish a home tutor if Melissa cannot at-
tend school, the secretary's interpretation would require
greater expenditure of public resources. 367
The court, therefore, held that if a child qualified for private duty
nursing under Medicaid, the child could bring the nurse to school in or-
der to be educated in the school setting. In a settlement agreement in
Pullen v. Cuomo,368 HHS agreed to adopt the Second Circuit's position
in Detsel v. Sullivan on a national basis. 369
The Detsel and Pullen decisions apply to Medicaid-eligible children
who require one-on-one and full-time nursing. In Skubel v. Fuoroli,370
the Second Circuit allowed a child to attend school with the help of a
part-time Medicaid nurse who provided the child with less intensive
364 Id. at 64 ("In view of advances in the care of severely handicapped individuals over
the past twenty-five years, we do not believe that the medical assumptions of the mid-1960s
offer a valid basis for the secretary's interpretation [of the at-home limitation to private duty
nursing].").
365 See id.
366 See id. at 64-65.
367 Id. at 65.
368 18 IDELR 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
369 See id.
370 113 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997).
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services. 371 Prior to this case, children receiving home health care serv-
ices under Medicaid could only receive these services while they were in
their place of residence.372 Similar to Detsel v. Sullivan, the Skubel court
held that the Secretary of HIIS's interpretation of the regulation 373 as
limiting these nursing services to a disabled child's residence was
unreasonable:
There does not appear to be any rational connection be-
tween the regulation and the purpose to be served by the
statute governing home nursing services. The regulation
ignores the consensus among health care professionals
that community access is not only possible but desirable
for disabled individuals. . . . The presence of a nurse
allows these people to go into their communities safely
with the care they require. [citation omitted].... [T]he
assumptions behind restricting home nursing exclusively
to the recipient's place of residence are no less medically
obsolete than those we rejected in Detsel.374
The court also found that eliminating the in-home restriction would
not result in any greater cost to Medicaid 375 and, under this holding, a
recipient of part-time home health services could now bring their nurse
with them outside of their residence.376
After Detsel, Pullen, and Skubel, any child is able to bring any type
of Medicaid nurse with him to school. For children who are Medicaid
eligible, the scole of the IDEA nursing benefit is never an issue. There
is no cost to schools for nursing services for Medicaid eligible children
because the home nurse paid for by Medicaid comes to school. Unfortu-
nately, not all children with special healthcare needs qualify for Medi-
caid assistance. Medicaid cases do not answer the question of what type
of nursing services a school must provide to a child who is not Medicaid
eligible, but these Medicaid policies at least reduce some of the total
burden on the school district.
The above examples illustrate the general tendency of school dis-
tricts and courts to over-emphasize the financial burdens of providing
disabled children with nursing services. The evidence indicates that the
actual cost to the schools is much less than many cases indicate. The
extent/nature test should be rejected because it relies largely on exagger-
ate estimates of the actual financial burdens borne by school districts.
371 See id. at 337.
372 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7) (1997).
373 42 C.F.R. § 440.70 (1997).
374 Skubel, 113 F.3d at 336-37.
375 See id. at 337.
376 See id
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c. Comparing Cost of Nursing Services with Other Related
Services
Courts adopting the extent/nature test use high cost as a justification
for saying that schools are not responsible for providing nursing services
to children with special health care needs.377 This reasoning does not
make sense when the cost of nursing services is compared with the costs
of other related services that the schools provide. For example, physical
therapy, occupational therapy, speech pathology, and audiology are spe-
cially listed related services. 378 A physical therapist earns about $37,596
per year;379 occupational therapists make around $39,634;380 a speech-
language pathologist earns, about $31,000 per year;381 and a certified
audiologist makes around $29,000 per year.382 These services may be
provided to disabled children one-on-one. 38 3 A single disabled child
may receive hours of a single service or a mixture of services each
week.384 These services are not excluded because of their cost. Nursing
services are not any more expensive than these other services. 38 5 The
cost rationality of the extent/nature test, therefore, breaks down when
compared with other provided (and expensive) related services.
2. Liability
Some courts have considered liability as a factor in opting for the
extent/nature test.386 More specifically, some courts use liability as a
factor in determining whether the burden on the school is such that the
service becomes "medical in nature. '387 For example, the Sixth Circuit
explicitly stated that it is "appropriate to take into account the risk in-
volved and the liability factor of the school" that is inherent in providing
a medical-type service.388 This issue usually arises when the child re-
377 See, e.g., Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D. N.J.
1996).
378 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(17)(1998).
379 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 342, at 171 (based on median 1994 earnings for
full-time physical therapist).
380 See id. at 167 (based on median 1994 earnings for a full-time occupational therapist).
381 See id. at 179 (based on median 1994 earnings for a full-time speech-language
pathologist).
382 See id. (based on median 1994 earnings for full-time certified audiologist).
383 See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9'
Cir. 1994); see also Part ll.B.5.
384 See TucKER & GoLDsTErN, supra note 81, at 8:5.
385 The median salary of a full-time LPN in 1994 was $23,294. See idL at 209. The
median full-time RN in 1994 earned $35,256. See U.S. Dm'T OF LABOR, supra note 342, at
175. A trained aid earns less than both LPN's and RN's per year.
386 See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6 Cir. 1995); see also Fulginiti v.
Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.N.J. 1996).
387 Id.
388 Neely, 68 F.3d at 971.
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quires nursing assistance that, if not provided properly, could cause se-
vere injury or death to the child.
The courts that rely on liability as a factor for identifying excluded
medical services based on the burden on the school district claim to be
relying on Tatro. Yet Tatro directly rejects the liability argument. The
Tatro court expressly rejected the school district's argument that CIC
should be excluded as a medical service because of liability of school
personnel in performing the service: 389
[Liability], however, bears no relation to whether CIC is
a 'related service.' The introduction of handicapped
children into a school creates numerous new possibilities
for injury and liability. Many of these risks are more
serious than that posed by CIC .... Congress assumed
that states receiving the generous grants under the Act
were up to the job of managing these new risks.
Whether petitioner decides to purchase more liability in-
surance or to persuade the State to extend the limitation
on liability, the risk posed by CIC should not prove to be
a large burden.390
The Supreme Court also rejected liability for performing health pro-
cedures as an appropriate reason for failing to provide the service to a
disabled child.391 Schools permit a number of high risk activities, in-
cluding sports teams and school trips, and such related services as occu-
pational therapy and physical therapy. If a school is concerned about
risk, then it can do what it does with every other activity-buy more
liability insurance or have liability waivers.
Courts using liability as a factor stated a concern that if schools
provide these health services, and if a catastrophic event occurs, then
distraught parents may sue the school board.392 It is unreasonable for
schools to use liability as an excuse for not providing health services
because schools are protected by qualified immunity.393 Qualified im-
munity protects teachers, school administrators, and school employees
(including nurses or aides) from individual liability in a majority of
circumstances. 3 94
Qualified immunity shields state actors "from liability for civil dam-
ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
conduct or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
389 See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 n.12 (1984).
390 Id.
391 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
392 See Neely, 68 F.3d at 971.
393 See Harlow, 457 U.S. 818.
394 See id.
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known. '395 For a plaintiff to win a suit, he must show both that the state
actor knew or should have known that his actions violated plaintiff's
rights and that those rights were clearly established at the time of the
official's action.396 When considering whether the law is applicable to a
set of facts, it is clearly established that the facts of the precedents relied
upon are important.397 This is a high standard for a plaintiff to meet.
In addition, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the
state action and his injury.398 Liability is, therefore, limited in the case
of individual suits against school employees, administrators, and teach-
ers. Based on Tatro and on the reality of immunity, liability is not an
adequate justification for accepting the extent/nature test over the physi-
cian/non-physician test.
3. Medical-In-Nature
A number of courts adopted the extent/nature test because it ex-
cludes services that are "medical-in-nature." 399 The first and most basic
problem is that no court has defined "medical-in-nature." It is unclear if
a service is classified as medical-in-nature by what procedures are re-
quired, by who performs those procedures, or by the intensity of the pro-
cedure. Furthermore, this justification does not make sense after
examining the language of the IDEA. The IDEA anticipates the need to
provide services that are medical-in-nature. These services are called
"school health services" and are specially denoted by regulation as re-
lated services. 400
Even if there was no health service regulation, the medical-in-nature
justification does not make sense when compared with other related serv-
ices that are provided. For example, the IDEA specifically lists speech
pathology, audiology, physical therapy, and occupational therapy as re-
lated services. 40' All of these related services are medical services. For
395 Id.; see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) ("A plaintiff who seeks dam-
ages... may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those
rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.")
396 KENNETH F. WARREN, ADmnSTRATIVE LAW IN THE PoLrricAL SYSTEM 475 (1996).
397 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("[I]n light of pre-existing, law the
unlawfulness [of the official action] must be apparent.").
398 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (holding a state official immune
from suit because the harm caused by his actions was too remote).
399 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 970-71 (6 Cir. 1995) (af-
firming lower court's finding that the school was not required to provide the medical services
because it was "medical-in-nature"); Granite Sch. Dist v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020,
1026 (D. Utah 1992) (relying on medical-in-nature language from Detsel to determine that the
requested service was an excluded medical service); Bd. of Educ. v. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. 1022,
1027 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the nursing services requested "more closely resemble the
medical services specially excluded by § 1401(17) of the [EHA]").
40o See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) (1998).
401 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998).
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example, a physical therapist's job includes many medical aspects.
Physical therapists "improve mobility, relieve pain, and prevent or limit
permanent physical disabilities of patients suffering from injuries or dis-
ease.' '4°2 Physical therapists "evaluate patients' medical histories, test
and measure their strength, range of motion, and ability-to function, and
then develop plans accordingly. '403 In addition to treatment by exercise:
[p]hysical therapists also use electrical stimulation, hot
or cold compresses and ultrasound to relieve pain, im-
prove the condition of the muscles or related tissues, and
to reduce swelling. They may use traction or deep-tissue
massage to relieve pain and restore function. Therapists
also teach patients to use crutches, prostheses, and
wheelchairs to perform day-to-day activities, and show
them exercises to do at home to expedite their
recovery.404
The training includes such science courses as biology, chemistry,
physics, biomechanics, neuroanatomy, human growth and development,
and manifestations of disease and trauma.405 Physical therapy, a covered
related service, is, therefore, at least as "medical-in-nature" as the provi-
sion of many nursing services to children with special health care needs.
Occupational therapy and speech pathology or audiology, which are
specifically covered related services, also provide medical services. A
speech pathologist or audiologist may provide treatment that includes
"examining and cleaning the ear canal, fitting a hearing aid, auditory
training, and instruction in speech or lip reading."'4°6 An occupational
therapist uses physical exercises to increase strength, dexterity, and coor-
dination. For patients with functional disabilities, an occupational thera-
pist "provide[s] such adaptive equipment as wheelchairs, splints and
aids... ."407 Both professions require courses such as biology and anat-
omy. Speech therapists, audiologists, and occupational therapists, there-
fore, provide medical services specific to their discipline. For example, a
school district in Idaho attempted to limit the physical and occupational
therapy provided to a student with cerebral palsy on the basis that the
need is medical rather than educational.408 The Assistant Secretary for
the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS)
specifically stated that "we [OSERS] find no support for this position in
402 U.S. DEP'T oF LABoR, supra note 342, at 169.
403 Id.
404 Id at 170.
405 See id.
406 Id at 178.
407 kd at 167.
408 See EHA Policy Letter of March 25, 1988, 213 EHA 118-21.
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either the EHA[ ] statute or regulations. '40 9 Although OSERS recog-
nized that there are medical elements to physical and occupational ther-
apy, it noted that the medical services exclusion is extremely narrow.410
Therefore, the OSERS held that these services could not be limited be-
cause of their medical nature.
The IDEA provides no objective way to compare the medical-relat-
edness of services provided by physical and occupation therapists,
speech pathologists, or audiologists to those provided by nurses.41' All
are medical and all can be related when they act as related services.
Therefore, "medical-in-nature" does not provide a proper basis for distin-
guishing nursing services from these other specially listed related
services.
4. Complexity and Training
A number of courts justify the adoption of the extent/nature test
because they claim the requested services are too complex and that
school nurses cannot provide them. A deeper analysis, however, makes
it clear that this is not an appropriate justification.
There are a number of different types of nurses. The are two types
of Registered Nurses (RN's)-Associate Degree in Nursing (ADN) and
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN).412 An ADN requires two years
of training after high school, and a BSN requires about four or five years
of training after high school.413 A second type of nurse is a Licensed
Practical Nurse (LPN), which requires a one-year program.414 Addition-
ally, paraprofessionals, trained lay-people, can provide a number of nurs-
ing services.
Each state defines by statute the qualifications necessary for each
type of nurse. Each state's regulatory body for nursing also defines ex-
actly which procedures each type of nurse may perform.415 The qualifi-
cations of a school nurse and procedures that a school nurse can perform
are defined by statute. The statutes often differ from state to state.
The court in Detsel ruled that the school nurse did not have to pro-
vide the requested procedure.416 If the court had explained the conclu-
409 Id. at 120.
410 See i&
411 See 34 CFR § 300.16 (1997).
412 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 342, at 174.
413 See id
414 See id. at 208 (most, but not all, LPN programs also require a high school diploma).
415 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34.21.1-93 (Michie 1997) (establishing a Board of Nursing to
regulate licensing and educational requirements of nurses); Apiz. REv. STAT. § 32.1601-.1668
(Supp. 1998) (establishing a Board of Nursing to regulate licensing and educational require-
ments of nurses); CoLo. R~visao STAT. ANN. § 12.38.101-.38.133 (Supp. 1998) (establishing
Arizona State Board of Nursing and nursing requirements).
416 See Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (N.D.N.Y 1986).
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sion, the court could have addressed the fact that the New York law,
applied in Detsel, by statute requires school nurses to be RN's. 417 The
New York Nurse Practice Act, which allows LPN's to provide suctioning
and all of the other services Melissa required, is also relevant. 418 Thus,
as a matter of law, a school nurse could have provided all the services
that Melissa needed. The court's conclusion that a school nurse could
not provide the services to Melissa can be explained either by the fact
that the nurse had other responsibilities and could not be in two places at
once, or that the nurse did not know the specific task. These reasons,
however, cannot justify the denial of a related service. The school could
have either hired another nurse or trained the existing nurse to learn the
specific procedures. The "inability" conclusion of the Detsel court,
therefore, was incorrect.
Courts also rely on an assumption that if a procedure requires a
great amount of expertise, then it is a medical service. For example,
courts distinguished Tatro factually by saying that CIC could be per-
formed by a trained layperson, while suctioning required an LPN or
RN.419 The reality of the situation is that although the procedure itself
may be the same state to state, who can provide the service often is not.
For example, Hawaii allows suctioning by a trained aide,420 while Ha-
waii also requires a registered nurse to provide suctioning. 42 1 It does not
make sense to say that even though the exact same service is provided to
two students in different states, it is medical (and therefore excluded) in
one instance and non-medical (and therefore covered) in the other case
simply because of the training of the person providing the service. The
expertise of the person providing the service is, therefore, not an appro-
priate measure of whether a service is medical or not.
Some courts rely on the training required by a nurse who can pro-
vide the services. 422 There are other providers of related services in the
school system who require at least as muclh or more training than a nurse.
For example, a special education teacher must have a four year bache-
lor's degree plus an additional year-long master's degree.423 A physical
or occupational therapist must have a four year bachelor's degree plus a
417 See N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 902(1) (McKinney 1997).
418 See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1025.
419 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 971 (6'h Cir. 1995); Granite
Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1029-30 (D. Utah 1992); Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at
1026.
420 See, e.g., Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 815 (9' Cir. 1983) (noting that
laypersons could be trained to provide suctioning).
421 See, e.g., Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1024 (stating suctioning must provided by a LPN or
RN); N.Y. EDUCATION LAw § 902(1) (McKinney 1997) (requiring school nurses to hold RN
degrees).
422 See, e.g., id at 1024.
423 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 342, at 154.
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one year master's degree.424 A speech pathologist or audiologist also
requires a bachelor's and may require a master's degree.425 All of these
providers of related services require at least as much or more training
than an LPN or RN. The training required by a nurse to provide services
to children with significant health care needs is, therefore, not an appro-
priate justification for adopting the extent/nature test.
5. Intensity
A number of courts adopted the extent/nature test because they be-
lieve that the more intensive a service is, the more it resembles the medi-
cal services the IDEA meant to exclude.426 In their interpretation of
Tatro, these courts limit the decision to the facts so that the school is
required to provide intermittent nursing services and not constant nursing
services. 427 In Bevin H., the court stated that it is the "private duty"
aspect that distinguishes the nursing services requested by Bevin (trache-
ostomy sucfioning, gastronomy care, and monitoring)428 from other serv-
ices held to be school health services and not excluded medical
services-such as CIC429 and suctioning of tracheostomy tube that was
only necessary a few times a day.430 The rationale behind the private
duty argument is that the school nurse would not always be available to
provide the service to the disabled student because she has a responsibil-
ity to all students, therefore, the school would have to hire a separate
nurse.431
When compared with other related services, this justification does
not make sense. Other related services are equally or more intensive and
are still provided. For example, schools provide a one-on-one aide to
teach behavioral or communication modification to autistic children.432
Schools also provide a one-on-one interpreter for deaf children.433
424 See id. at 167, 170.
425 See id. at 178.
426 See, e.g., Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1026-27 (D. Utah
1992); Bevin H. v. Wright., 666 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Pennsylvania 1987).
427 See, e.g., Detsel, 820 F.2d at 587.
428 See Bevin H., 666 F. Supp. at 75.
429 See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 894 (1984); Tokarcik v. Forest
Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 458 (3' Cir. 1981).
430 See Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 812 (9"' Cir. 1983).
431 See Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. at 1026; Bevin H., 666 F. Supp. at 75; Detsel, 637 F.
Supp. at 1025.
432 See, e.g., Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 999 (4"' Cir.
1997) (holding IEP that provided for full-time one-on-one aide to assist autistic child with
facilitated communication was appropriate); X v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 975 F. Supp.
546 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding provision of one-on-one aide to provide behavioral modification
to autistic child was appropriate).
433 See, e.g., Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 832 (9h Cir. 1995) (holding provision of a
full-time interpreter to a deaf child was appropriate).
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Other related services are not excluded simply because they must be
provided in a one-on-one fashion. No clear reason exists why nursing
services should be treated any differently. Just because a service must be
provided on an individual basis should not change whether it is consid-
ered a related service or an excluded medical service. Intensity is, there-
fore, not a legitimate reason for adopting the extent/nature test.
6. Number of Nursing Procedures
The number of nursing procedures that the nurse must provide to
the disabled student is also not an appropriate justification for adopting
the extent/nature test. As long as the provision of the requested service is
within the skills of the nurse, it should not matter whether the nurse has
to provide a single procedure (such as suctioning) once per day, a single
procedure numerous times during a day, or a number of procedures (such
as suctioning, provision of oxygen, and monitoring) once or many times
during the day. Additionally, the number of nursing procedures justifica-
tion ignores the fact that the procedure being done is the same each time.
The courts give no guidance on how many times a procedure may be
performed before it is transformed from a related service to an excluded
medical service. Once a school day, once a period, or once an hour?
This number of procedures test does not exist for other listed related
services. The number of procedures rationale behind the extent/nature
test must, therefore, be rejected because it provides no objective basis for
capping the amount of nursing services a student can receive.
7. Traditional Roles
Some courts justify the adoption of the extent/nature test by stating
that it is more true to the traditional roles of school nurses than the physi-
cian/non-physician test.434 These traditional nursing activities include
such activities as administering medicine, providing first aid, and screen-
ing for vision and hearing problems.435 Traditional nursing services do
not require school nurses to provide such services as monitoring a venti-
lator and suctioning a tracheostomy tube.
There is no traditional role of nurses in regard to disabled students.
Before the passage of the EHA, many children with disabilities were not
in school.43 6 In the early 1970's, the Bureau of Education for the Handi-
capped estimated that over 1.75 million disabled children were receiving
no educational services at all.437 Over 2.5 million children were receiv-
ing an inappropriate education-meaning that those children were edu-
434 See, e.g., Hopedale Sch. Dist., 17 EHLR 973 (SEA Mass. 1991).
435 See id. at 8.
436 See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1425, 1432.
437 See id
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cated in institutionalized, segregated facilities for the disabled. 438 As of
1997, Congress still found that over "1,000,000 of the children with disa-
bilities in the United States are excluded entirely from the public school
system."439 A school nurse's traditional role regarding disabled students
can only be described as a non-sequitor.
The ERA and IDEA do not support the notion that only traditional
services should be provided to disabled students. The EHA changed the
entire school system. For example, the EHA required schools to change
everything from their physical buildings 44° to their educational curricu-
lum.441 Schools were required to add new services that they had never
offered before, including special education, speech pathology, physical
therapy, and occupational therapy. 442 The statute forced the schools to
make the changes quickly and under stringent time frames.443 Most im-
portantly, there was nothing that the statute exempted from changing be-
cause of its "traditional role."
In light of the history of the education of disabled children, courts'
reliance on traditional roles in schools seems quite misplaced. The tradi-
tional role of nurses, therefore, does not justifying the adoption of the
extent/nature test over the physician/non-physician test.
C. APPLICATION
The extent/nature test does not establish a clear objective test that
can be applied with consistency. The extent/nature test is subjective; it is
up to the school administrator, hearing officer, or judge to decide
whether a service is so similar to a medical service as to require exclu-
sion. The extent/nature test does not establish any clear guidelines of
how courts should balance the interests of the individual disabled student
and the interests of the school in light of the EHA/IDEA. It is similar to
the "I know it when I see it test" espoused by Justice Stewart regarding
pornography.4" The judge has total discretion in the application of the
test. This lack of guidelines led to inconsistent application of the IDEA
provisions.
Additionally, the extent/nature test has fails to establish a single na-
tional standard. The current interpretation of the medical services exclu-
sion makes jurisdiction the key factor in determining whether a nursing
service will be provided to a student. For example, the students in Gar-
438 See id.
439 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(4)(1997).
440 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (1998).
441 For example, schools had to begin providing special education. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1401(25), 1412(a) (1998).
442 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(22) (1998).
443 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1997).
444 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ret F. and Detsel requested the same services. The court in Garret F.
adopted the bright line test and provided the nursing services. On the
other hand, the court in Detsel adopted the extent/nature test and refused
to provide the nursing services. This leads to the conclusion that nursing
services are being provided by zip code. If the student happens to live in
a jurisdiction where the court accepted the bright line physician/non-phy-
sician test, then the nursing service will be provided. If the students hap-
pens to live in a jurisdiction where the court has accepted the extent/
nature test, the nursing service will probably not be provided. This result
does not fit well with the national mandate that schools provide appropri-
ate education to all disabled students.
Lastly, the result of the application of the extent/nature test is that
only poor and insured children are able to go to school. The IDEA never
contemplated such an economic-based result. If a child is poor enough
to qualify for Medicaid, then the child can bring their Medicaid nurse to
school.445 On the other hand, if a child's family has private insurance
that will cover the costs of nursing services, then the child will be able to
attend school.446 Other disabled children living in jurisdictions which
apply the extent/nature test, however, will not be able to attend school.
The IDEA created a national mandate for schools to provide an educa-
tion to all disabled children. The Act did not anticipate educational op-
portunities for disabled children to be based upon how much money that
child's family has. The application of the extent/nature test, therefore, is
not consistent with the statute and its goals and purposes.
D. DISCRIIINATION
1. Discrimination Vis-ii-vis Other Disabled Individuals
The entire process of deciding the scope of nursing services may be
discriminatory in and of itself. As discussed above, it appears that the
courts developed special tests to apply to related services that a health
impaired individual might need which do not apply to related services
needed by an individual with another disability. For example, schools
are willing to provide a one-on-one aide for behavior management but
are not willing to provide a one-on-one aide to provide nursing services.
The school is willing to provide physical therapy, which is medical in
nature, to a child with a physical disability but is not willing to provide
445 See, e.g., Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990); Pullen v. Cuomo, 18 IDELR
132 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
446 See, e.g., Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1997) (case was brought once
a private insurance plan would not cover the majority of the nursing services and the extra
hours had to be covered by Medicaid); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 72 (W.D. Penn.
1987) (case was brought because parents had reached their insurance cap by paying for private
nursing services in school for a number of years).
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nursing services to a health impaired child because the services are medi-
cal in nature. This appears to be discrimination based on the type of
disability that a child has.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is generally thought not only
to cover claims of discrimination between disabled and non-disabled
people, but also to cover claims involving one group of disabled people
claiming discrimination vis-h-vis another group of disabled people.447
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether such claims fall into the
scope of section 504.448
The majority of courts have held that section 504 covers discrimina-
tion claims between different groups of disabled people.44 9 The lan-
guage of the Statute appears to support such claims. The regulations of
section 504 specifically state that a state receiving federal funding vio-
lates the law when it "[p]rovide[s] different or separate aid, benefits, or
services to handicapped persons or to any class of handicapped persons"
unless it is necessary to make the services equally effective.450
[A]s a matter of statutory construction, nothing in the
language of § 504 suggests that it can never apply be-
tween persons with different handicaps. Rather, the lan-
guage of § 504 evinces an intent to eliminate handicap-
based discrimination and segregation. A strict rule that
§ 504 can never apply between persons with different
disabilities would thwart that goal. Such a rule would, in
effect, allow discrimination on the basis of disability.
The relevant inquiry is whether the application of § 504
between persons with different or varying degrees of dis-
447 See gen'erally TUCKER & GoLDS'mN, supra note 81, at 6:27-6:29.
448 But see Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988) (holding that a statute which ex-
cluded one group of individuals from its benefits does not violate section 504). The majority
of courts have interpreted Traynor to apply narrowly to federal statutes that provide benefits to
any one class or number of classes of people with disabilities. See TUCKER & GoLDSnEI,
supra note 81, at 6:29 n.149.
449 See, e.g., Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3 Cir. 1979) (allowing a § 504 suit claiming
that statute discriminated against mentally disabled individuals vis-4-vis physically disabled
people); Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (allowing § 504 claims that
mentally disabled individuals were discriminated against vis-A-vis people with other disabili-
ties); McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing § 504 claim of discrimi-
nation against a paraplegic individual vis-A-vis blind people); but see, e.g., P.C. v.
McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2 Cir. 1990) (stating that § 504 does not "clearly establish
an obligation to meet [a person with a disability's] particular need vis-,-vis the needs of other
handicapped individuals, but mandate[s] only that services provided nonhandicapped individu-
als not be denied [to a disabled individual] because he is handicapped"); Colin K. v. Schmidt,
715 F.2d 1, 9 (1- Cir. 1983) ("[W]e have serious doubts whether Congress intended § 504 to
provide plaintiffs with a claim for discrimination vis- 4-vis other handicapped
individuals .... ).
450 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(iv) (1998) (emphasis added).
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ability furthers the goal of eliminating disability-based
discrimination.451
Additionally, the policy behind section 504 supports the idea that
both claims of discrimination vis-A-vis non-disabled and other people
with disabilities should be allowed. Two commentators point out that
"Discrimination against particular classes or subclasses of people with
disabilities is just as invidious as any other form of discrimination, and,
as such, is within the scope of the discriminatory conduct Congress
sought to prohibit when enacting § 504."452
A claim of discrimination vis-t-vis disability may also exist under
the ADA. The language of Title II of the ADA is similar to that of
section 504.453 Because of the similarities in language and purposes be-
tween the ADA and section 504, a number of courts held that a claim of
discrimination vis-h-vis other disabled individuals also exists under the
ADA.
4 5 4
A child with special health care needs who is denied nursing serv-
ices may, therefore, have a claim of discrimination vis-4-vis other classes
of disabled children under section 504 or the ADA. Using the extent/
nature test, courts are not requiring schools to provide nursing services as
a related service to a child because it is medical in nature, costly, com-
plex, requires training, or is intense. As discussed in Part II.B. of this
article, however, other related services that are provided by the schools
have these qualities. The process of using any test-especially the ex-
tent/nature test-in the provision of one related service while not placing
a similar barrier in front of children with other disabilities who are get-
ting the same or indistinguishable related services indicates that children
with special health care needs are being discriminated against vis-h-vis
children with other disabilities.
2. Discrimination Through Fears and Stereotypes
The policy of the IDEA to educate disabled children with non-dis-
abled children was, in part, meant to eliminate prejudice against people
with disabilities through exposure and interaction.455 The result of the
extent/nature test, unfortunately only furthers discrimination. A school
may not want to provide services for a number of inappropriate reasons.
451 Martin, 840 F. Supp. at 1192.
452 TucKER & GoLDSm'N, supra note 81, at 6:28.
453 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1997) ("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities or a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."); cf 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1997).
454 See, e.g., Martin, 840 F. Supp. at 1192.
455 See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 n.24 (3' Cir. 1993).
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A school may fear that a child might die while in its care or may fear
liability for provision of services. The services requested may also be
unpleasant to perform. The school may find it disagreeable for the other
children to be around and see children with holes and tubes. Lastly, the
school may have a traditional view that children with health care needs
are "sick" and, therefore, do not belong in school. Keeping children with
special health care needs out of the schools does nothing to dissipate this
discrimination and fear. These reasons are inappropriate and only in-
crease the fear and prejudice against people with disabilities. The extent/
nature test, therefore, must be rejected because it allows schools to foster
inappropriate, discriminatory reasons for excluding children with special
health care needs.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE PHYSICIANINON-PHYSICIAN TEST
Although the nature/extent test cannot be justified based upon the
above discussed considerations, this does not necessarily mean that the
physician/non-physician test is correct. The bright-line physician/non-
physician test may be more appropriate based on the language of Tatro,
the IDEA, and the DOE regulations. The physician/non-physician test
also has its weaknesses.
For the most part, the extent/nature test leads to the result that any
expensive, complex, or constant nursing service will be excluded and the
child will not be placed in school. On the other hand, the physician/non-
physician test leads to the result that all nursing services are covered and
every child will be placed in the school. Although the physician/non-
physician test might lead to better results in light of the general purposes
of the IDEA, the test has no real meaning in application. In reality, there
are few if any services required by a child as supportive services that
must be provided by a doctor. A doctor might prescribe medication or
generally supervise treatment, but these are not to be excluded medical
services. 456 A doctor would only be necessary for medical procedures
that would not be considered supportive services by any definition of the
word.457 Thus, both of the extent/nature and the physician/non-physician
tests lead to extreme results.
456 See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984).
457 For example, no matter how broad the definition of supportive service is interpreted,
having a doctor perform kidney surgery on a child at school is clearly an excluded medical
service. It is, however, arguably a supportive service to have a doctor prescribe dialysis treat-
ment that a child requires every four hours, since a child would be unable to be in school
without the provision of that service.
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V. SUGGESTIONS
Rather than adopt the extent/nature test or the physician/non-physi-
cian test, the best alternative is to have no test. Nothing in the language
of the IDEA or its regulations require there to be any test for the provi-
sion of nursing services. The language only requires that medical serv-
ices-those services provided by doctors-be excluded if they are not
for evaluation or diagnostic purposes. Schools should not impose any
extra tests and should simply treat children with special health care needs
as they treat all other children.
All non-disabled children are presumed to be required to attend
school unless their doctor or family decides they are too sick to attend.
These same rules should apply to children with special health care needs.
This premise fits into the statutory scheme of the IDEA regulations. The
regulations provide that: "Unless the IEP of a child with a disability re-
quires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that he
or she would attend if nondisabled. ' '458 The default assumption would be
that the disabled child will attend school, and that the school must as-
sume responsibility for providing supportive services, including nursing.
The school should have to meet a substantial burden in order to over-
come the presumption and exclude a child. This test also fits within the
holding of Tatro. Tatro established that schools have a responsibility to
provide nursing services to children with special health care needs.459 It
should not matter what particular nursing services are required. Further-
more, the need for nursing services should not affect placement. As long
as a child with special health care needs does not have another need
warranting removal from school, then the default assumption should
apply.
None of the cases state that children with special health care needs
cannot benefit from school. In fact, every case noted that the appropriate
placement for these children was in school with their peers. There may
exist a child that has such extreme health impairments that he would not
be able to benefit from being in school, but none of the cases to date have
identified such a child. In fact, the presumption is to the contrary.4 60 It
follows that the default rule should reflect the norm and not the
exception.
Instead of having the schools or courts decide whether a child
should attend school, the child's family and doctor should make that de-
cision. If the child's doctor gives the student medical clearance to attend
458 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(c) (1997).
459 See Tatro, 486 U.S. at 883 (holding the school responsible for the provision of Clean
Intermittent Catheterization to a student with special heath care needs).
460 See, e.g., Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H. Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1 Cir. 1989)
(assuming a disabled child can benefit from being in school and receiving special education).
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school, then the child should be able to attend; but if the child's doctor
determines that the student is too ill to attend school, then the child
should stay home. It is unlikely that a parent or doctor would force a
school to admit a child that is too ill to attend. Like the case with all
other children, this would put the choice of whether the child is able to
attend school with the child's parents and his doctor, instead of with a
school official who is not as familiar with the conditions and capabilities
of the child. This policy makes the most sense in its application, pro-
vides a clear, objective standard and creates a single national rule. This
presumption also has the benefit of focusing on the child. The problem
with the extent/nature test is that it focuses on the requested services.
The problem with the physician/non-physician test is that it focuses on
the status of the provider. All other questions of special education, in-
cluding provision of related and supportive services, focus on the needs
of the child. This presumption effectively shifts the focus to the child
and forces schools to treat the needs of children with special health care
problems the same as they treat children with other disabilities. In light
of the goals of the IDEA, it makes the most sense.
CONCLUSION
Many children with special health care needs are excluded from
public schools. The IDEA and its legislative history do not clearly deal
with the issue of whether schools must provide extensive nursing serv-
ices to these children. The decision of the Supreme Court in Tatro did
not give clear answer to this question. Lower courts have interpreted
Tatro as suggesting two different tests.
The extent/nature test was adopted in several circuits and takes into
account factors such as cost, liability, and intensity. These factors are
not appropriate considerations and are not taken into account when ana-
lyzing other related services or in other areas of special education law.
The extent/nature test does not give enough guidance to courts and can-
not be applied to provide consistent results. The extent/nature test
should, therefore, be rejected.
The physician/non-physician test is somewhat better. It makes more
sense in light of the language of the IDEA, the DOE's regulations, and
Tatro. While the physician/non-physician test also leads to better results
based on the purposes of the IDEA, the physician/non-physician test has
no real meaning since there are no services that doctors must provide io
children in a school setting. A better alternative would, therefore, be to
remove the decision-making process from the schools and courts and
place them in the hands of the child's family and doctor.
Right now, children with special health care needs are being kept
out of school while the courts argue about how to set appropriate stan-
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dards. Just as Brown v. Board of Education opened the doors of public
schools to African-American children, the government must eliminate
the barriers keeping children with special health care needs out of school.
The Supreme Court has the ability to remove those barriers by making
the right decision in the Garret F. case. Hopefully the Supreme Court
will take advantage of this opportunity to make the goal of providing a
free appropriate public education to all children a reality.

